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From 1871 to 1914, Germany experienced its first taste
of world power and the failure of controlling and retaining
that power.

German power after 1871 had sought only a

dominance of continental politics and a maintenance of a
status quo in Europe favorable to Germany.

Following 1890,

however, the German course deviated to include a vision of
world power.

German foreign policy until 1890 was based on

two things: hegemonic control of the heart of Europe and the
force of will of one man, Otto von Bismarck.

Yet despite

relative control of the European situation and a cautious
and able statesman at the helm, Germany was quickly
intoxicated by its new power as much as reacting against the
almost oppressive control of Bismarck.

By all measures, the

German appetite for power was growing faster than ordinary
diplomatic conquests could satisfy it.

The need for instant

gratification caused a recklessness in foreign policy and
diplomacy best characterized by Yrisepolitik, or crisis
diplomacy.

This dilemma not only resulted from a growing

appetite for power, but also from a lack of understanding of
international politics.

The European reaction to the new

German aggressiveness and to the lack of direction in German

policy was one of suspicion.

With the cancellation of the

Reinsurance Treaty with Russian in 1890, every German
move
was viewed by increasingly hostile eyes.

Axes of power

began to form which much threatened the growing world
power
of Germany, a Germany which saw the need to contes
t the
powers on as many points as possible, while avoidi
ng war, to
retain its power in the 1890s and the first years
of the
twentieth century.

Chapter I
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Under Bismarck

By its size, population, and economy, Germany in 1871 was
still not a world power.
of dominating Europe.

Germany, in fact, was on the verge

With such a tense atmosphere, the

future depended on Germany.

The question Germany and the

rest of Europe faced was how the new German power would be
used.

The Reich enjoyed a position of relative hegemony,

not open or absolute.

The unification of Germany in one

state could mean German domination in Europe, provoking
massive resistance from the other great European powers.
The conflict abroad which would come of such a situation
would also reactivate internal conflicts which might well
defeat Germany before the unification process was completed.
Only in this way can Bismarck's formula be understood.
Germany was satiated after 1871.

On the one hand, he wanted

to appease suspicious neighbors, and on the other, he warned
against German expansionists who threatened his achievements
with their ambitions.

Yet in his time as Chancellor he

never tried to educate the German public so that at least
the ruling circles would have some understanding uf his
insight or of the dangers of nationalism.1
The new situation in Europe in 1871 left still unanswered
questions for Germany.

Bismarck could have chose to seek

lImanuel Geiss, German Foreign Policy, 1871-1914
(Boston, 1976), 12-13.
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repetitions of the victories of 1866 and 1870 or extend
power in the East, with success in the latter depending on
avoidance of a two front war by alliance with France.
was not a likely possibility.

This

Germany might even have

joined in alliance with Russia and France against British
colonialism, though such a course could be to the detriment
of German expansion in the future and a great provocation
for war.

However, lismarck chose to preserve his gains, and

his diplomatic role reversed after 1871.

He went from a

diplomatic revolutionary to a diplomatic conservative.

Seen

from the German standpoint, however, his objectives were
always conservative.

They reflected the interests

of his

own class while still fulfilling the dream of unification.
But despite the change in objective, the problems remained
the same.

Bismarck had to isolate Austria and France while

placating Russia and Britain.

Isolating Austria-Hungary was

an easy task in her weakened state, mainly due to her
diplomatic blunderings in the 1850s and 1860s.
France was more difficult.

Isolating

While Bismarck sought to

preserve the status quo of 1871, France sought to undo it.
Furthermore, France had to make Bismarck appear the
aggressor, while Bismarck played the role of peace-loving
statesman.

In regards to France, German foreign policy

toward Russia and Britain was clear.

Bismarck had to avoid

alienating either by threatening their interests or the
balance of power in Europe.

He accomplished this by

3
respecting British interests in the Low Countries, the Near
East, the colonial world, and the naval issues; with Russia,
he paid special attention to Russian interests in Poland,
the Balkans, and the Near East.

Meanwhile, the Chancellor

persuaded both Russia and Britain that Germany had all it
wanted and would decline to threaten the balance of power.
As L.L. Farrar, Jr. notes in

Arrogance and Anxiety: the

Ambivalence of German Power, 1848-1914 , "Bismarck, in order
to retain what he had, renounced more."2
Overall, Bismarck was successful in office, but the task
was not easy.

Making Austria-Hungary and Russia accept the

status quo was difficult enough, but Austria-Hungary also
had to be preserved, which meant reconciliation with Russia.
Manipulation achieved this, and a general acceptance of the
status quo in the Balkans by the two powers was the sign of
success.

If either Austria-Hungary or Russia had changed

their policies toward or sought change in the Balkans, or if
internal strife in the region changed the status quo to the
detriment of either, then reconciliation would have been
difficult.

But not only would the two powers have to be

reconciled and accept a Balkan status quo for success,
Germany would also have to show restraint while also
appearing to restrain Austria-Hungary in the region to avoid
Russian antipathy.

Bismarck's policy hinged on Austro-

2L.L. Farrar, Arrogance and Anxiety: the Ambivalence of
German Power (Iowa City, Iowa, 1981), 11-13.
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Russian reconciliation, German restraint of Austria and
Russia, and Germany's own interests as well.
While the Balkans complicated Bismarck's task,
imperialism served to simplify it.

Distracted from Europe,

the other European powers gave too much attention to
international imperial difficulties to make much progress
toward an anti-German coalition.

Bismarck generally

encouraged these rivalries, but discouraged a German
imperialism which would drive the other powers together
against Germany.

Likewise, the involvement of the other

powers outside Europe depended on European security, and
Germany's refusal to upset the balance of power was both to
encourage imperialism and exclude a general European
struggle which would dissolve the still young Germany.
Again, German restraint, this time internally, was a
necessity for success.3

This German restraint depended on

Bismarck's ability to resist pressures in Germany which
sought a more aggressive policy.

Consequently, his domestic

policy became analogous to his foreign policy, one of
isolation and balance. He encouraged the monarchy, lesser
royalty, and aristocracy to remain conservative by
preserving their dominant position in the new Germany.
Bismarck attempted to bring the old liberals in line with
the new Germany.

To do this he had to satisfy their thirst

for a national state.

3ibid., 13-14.

For the bourgeoisie, he offered the

5
prospect of great wealth.

Preserving aristocratic power and

rural society satisfied the German people from seeking
greater political power with the prospects of peace and
prosperity.

His success in this domestic policy depended on

his control of foreign policy and the combining of the two
policies.

He maintained this control by insuring that

foreign policy remained the prerogative of the monarch, i.e.
the Chancellor, who Bismarck was able to control for a
generation.

The Chancellor was able to restrain German

power because his previous successes had reinforced the
conservative system and his control over policy.
Unlike diplomatic policy, military strategy remained
conservative.

Unlike 1866 and 1870, where offense of

victory was sought to change the status quo in central
Europe, the military strategy of 1871 and after became quite
defensive to avoid upsetting the new state of Europe.

Also,

it was realized that after 1871, Germany might have to fight
a coalition; German victory would upset the balance of
power, and Germany would have to make domestic concessions
to get the amount of manpower needed.

Germany after 1871

was seen as a threat to the traditional European system,
possibly bringing the other powers together against Germany.
War threatened the domestic political structure of Germany
even if Germany won.

Diplomatic, military and political

6
considerations reinforced one another in making German
strategy conservative.4
Generally, the Foreign Ministry and Diplomatic Service of
Germany were the equal if not superior to any in Europe
during Bismarck's tenure as Chancellor.

The heart of the

Foreign Ministry was the Political Division, usually
referred to in documents and memoirs as 'A', meaning 'das
Ant'(the office).

The people of this division had

distinguished themselves from colleagues in other divisions,
usually within the Diplomatic Service.

The most important

members of this division in the 1880s were Lothan Bucher,
Fritz von Holstein, Arthur von Brauer, and Graf Kuno von
Rantzau.5

The Diplomatic Service was not inferior to the

Foreign Ministry, though many of its best people later went
to the Political Division.

By 1872, Bismarck had eliminated

the disorder of the Prussian service and made his corps of
envoys effective enough to rival and in some cases even
surpass their counterparts in the rest of Europe.

However,

both the Diplomatic Service and the Foreign Ministry had
several weaknesses.
Bismarck himself.

The responsibility for this lay with
He always chose his aides with care for

intelligence and technical skill, constantly protecting
their positions and improving the material conditions of

4ibid., 14-15.
5Gordon A. Craig, Germany
135-136.

1866-1945 (New York, 1978),
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their work.

They were the principle instruments of foreign

policy; but only instruments, for it was always Bismarck's
foreign policy, and the Chancellor's emphasis on this
stunted initiative and judgement in the Foreign Ministry.6
There are several reasons for Bismarck's astounding
success in diplomacy:

he had a clear perception of his

ultimate goals; a well chosen series of alternate paths to
achieve those aims; a keen insight into the objectives of
opponents and a willingness to defer to them as long as they
did not stand in his way; and moderation, which was his
greatest strength.

He was never caught up in the

intoxication of victory, never demanding more than was
necessary for his immediate objective.7

Yet despite

repeated success, the structure of German diplomacy was
flawed because it depended far too much on one man.

The

fault may have lain with the importance Bismarck attached to
discipline.

He had had to cope with envoys who, on a

regular basis, had replaced foreign policies made in Berlin
with their own.

This was most clearly shown in the

Chancellor's dealings with Harry Arnim, ambassador to

6Lamar Cecil, The German Diplomatic Service,
1871-1914
(Princeton, 1976), 41-51; and Gordon A. Craig, "Bismarck and
his Ambassadors: the Problem of Discipline," Foreign Service
Journal, xxxiii (June, 1956).
7Sidney B. Fay, "Germany under Bismarck and
his
Successors," Current History, 28 (1955), 212.
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France, in 1873.8
insubordination.

This event put a total end to
Efficiency in the execution of policy

increased, but at a price.

The members of the Foreign

Ministry were terrified of Bismarck, and initiative in the
Diplomatic Service became a thing of the past.

By keeping

his envoys in the dark over his intentions, making it
dangerous for them to initiate possible routes of
negotiation, Bismarck created a diplomatic corps that could
not appreciate or judge the larger issues of diplomacy
outside their own limited areas.

At the moment of crisis--

the debate over renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty with
Russia in 1890--Bismarck's way of handling the Foreign
Service only served to ruin the basis of his diplomatic
system.9
But it may be doubted whether any German leader, no
matter how talented, would have been able to hold back the
expansive force of German society.

Two essential factors

made Germany's collision with Europe and the rest of the
world hard to avoid.

On the one hand was the increasing

industrialization and pop.A.ation of Germany, and on the

8Arnim argued in 1872 that Germany's object should be
to -estore the French monarchy, an argument to which the
Kaiser was sympathetic,
' .:_otally against Bismarck's
policy. He warned the ambassador against further tampering
with the policy of the Foreign Ministry, but Arnim paid no
heed.
Bismarck then persuaded the Kaiser to agree to
replacement and went as far as to hound Arnim out of the
Diplomatic Service and bring criminal charges against him
for misuse of state information.
9Cecil, German Diplomatic Service, 55-58.

9
other was the reality of a German Empire that was a forced
national state.

The German Empire stood fo7 a concentration

of power in the traditional and new ruling classes of
Germany, the aristocracy and the middle class.

The Reich

was built on the solidarity of these class-s and their
eventual formation of one class through marriage and
economic interests.

But this combination produced a

paralysis inside and outside of Germany.

In domestic policy

the two main classes balanced each other through their
domestic economic interests.

However, in foreign policy,

divergent ideological interests and economic interests
hindered the articulation of a clear foreign policy
supported by al1.10

Consequently, the paralysis outside

Germany upset the harmony of the classes in domestic policy,
thus creating inner paralysis.

Divergent economic interests

and ideological traditions clashed in foreign policy.

The

dilemma produced a foreign policy that satisfied short-term
(domestic) economic interests but clashed with ideologies.
Most important, this paralysis preventd a clear choice
between Britain and Russia.

The high grain tariffs after

the passage of the Tariff Law of 1879 and the later closing
of the German financial market to Russian loans in 1887

1°Eckhardt Kehr, "Englandhass und Weltpolitik. Eine
Studie ueber die innenpolitischen und sozialen Grunlagen der
deutschen Aussenpolitik um die Jahrhundertwende" in Primat
der Innenpolitik, 44-51, 65, 149-51, where Kehr first showed
this fundamental mechanism in 1928, though it did not come
to general atteneion until 1965.
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drove Russia away from its traditional friend, the Junker.
Similary, as German industry grew stronger, it pressed for
protective tariffs to keep out cheap British goods.

Anti-

British economic interests became an anti-British foreign
policy, culminating in Weltpolitik and the building of a
German battle fleet.

The two most powerful classes worked

at cross purposes, and German statecraft failed to
coordinate these divergent forces.

This paralysis

inconsistent with Bismarck's use of power.

was

The chasm grew

worse with each year up to Bismarck's dismissal.

In 1871,

diplomatic, domestic, and military powers coincided with
German power.

By placating and restraining both Russia and

Britain, Bismarck had effectively isolated France and kept
her from undoing the settlements of 1871.

Thus, German

policies were consistent with German power and Bismarck
lived within his means of power.

However, the increase in

power after 1871 rendered Bismarck's fears and his policy
seemingly anachronistic.11

Having gained more power than it

had ever known before by 1890, Germany and Germans justified
a need for less restraint.

Despite the fact that Bismarckian policy was fatally
flawed due to a lack of understanding of domestic stresses,
a ruthlessly subordinated diplomatic corps, and a failure to
educate the ruling class as to his aims and intentions,

11Farrar, Arrogance and Anxiety, 15.
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Bismarck was still the most indelible diplomatist of his
day.

His success was due largely to his playing on the fear

of European monarchies which felt threatened by
revolutionary forces.

From 1870 to 1890, Bismarck's

reliance on this trend was one of the most effective tools
in his European diplomacy, though opportunism caused varied
uses of it, usually in the interests of German nationalism.
Throughout his career he sought to play on the interests of
European monarchists.

He was often successful in using old

ideas of the virtue of monarchism to work to his advantage.
But when support of such monarchial values did not agree
with his aims, he would abandon the principle altogether,
only to return to it laterJ2

This was true of many of his

policies.
During the Franco-Prussian war Bismarck negotiated with
both republican and monarchist factions.

He showed an

ideological indifference as to the nature of the French
government.

Yet the revengeful maneuvers of the French

monarchists ruled out the possibility of German support of
the monarchist faction.

Also, Bismarck feared revenge on

the part of a restored clerical monarchy in France.

Thus,

it was logical to conclude peace or some kind of
rapprochement with the republic in power rather than seek
monarchial restoration.

Furthermore, it was Bismarck's

12Marvin Brown, "The Monarchial Principle in
Bismarckian Diplomacy after 1870," The Historian, 15
(Autumn, 1952), 41-42.
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belief that a French republic would be shunned by other
monarchies, a belief shared by everyone.

The alliance of

France, Austria, and Russia on a religious basis--which
Bismarck particularly feared--became an unlikely
possibility.
While tacitly supporting the Third French Republic
against monarchial factions, and eyeing the desired
territory of Alsace-Lorraine as an industrial basin and
military buffer, Germany and Bismarck set about building an
alliance system to isolate the potential enemy, France, seen
as the only continental power standing full-square in the
way of Germany dominating Europe.

An effective approach

linked with the concerns of the contracting states was the
need to consolidate and protect the monarchial principle in
light of the radical movements in Europe.

The first of this

type of Bismarck's alliances, the League cf the Three
Emperors in 1873, showed comparatively little formal appeal
to monarchial principles as such,li

suggesting that it was

an understood, if not expressed, part of the regotiations
and ultimate treaty.
Yet after the Congress of Berlin completed tne rupture
between Russia and her former allies, Bismarck gave great
attention to monarchial considerations in establishing the
Austro-German alliance of 1879 and also in bringing Russia
back to tripartite neutrality in the Alliance of the Three

13ibid., 45.

•
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Emperors in 1881.

Bismarck expressed these views concerning

Russian inclusion in a monarchial alliance to William I:

The tsar apparently believes he strengthens his
internal position by a warlike bearing towards foreign
countries and perhaps does not notice his domestic
enemies also seek war. I have many personal friends
in Russia, and the conservatives among them are all of
the opinion that Niclolai Miliutin, directly or
indirectly, is at the head of the agitation in Russia,
namely of the Nihilists.
Whether he carries on his
agitation, for which he finds the tsar the most
powerful tool, in the interests of a constitutional
Russia under the Grand Duke Constantine, or whether,
which is more likely, a republic is more desirable, is
a matter of no importance as regards to our interests.
But, one may take it for granted, the revolutionary
party sees in the League of the Three Emperors and in
the bond between Tsar Alexander and your majesty a
strong hinderance to its plans, and these would have
better prospects in world turmoil than in peace.

In the same letter Bismarck told William that only
monarchial bonds remained between the two countries, and
that any answer to the Russians concerning the alliance
would have to be concilatory.14

Any future reluctance,

according to Bismarck, would have to stress monarchial bonds
and a "sacred legacy, which our fathers, hallowed in memory,
have left to us intact and the use of which God will someday
demand account and whkch constitutes in the interest of all
European monarchies one of the last and greatest benefits of
the peace of the monarchial order, which Europe still enjoys

14 Bismarck to William 1, August
24, 1879, Die Grosse
Politik der Europaeischen Kabinette 1871-1914, ed. J.
Lepsius, A. Bartholdy, F. Thimme (Berlin, 1922-1927), 3, 1718. Hereafter cited as Die Grosse Politik.

14
to this day. u15

This was a form meant to favorably impress

Tsar Alexander II.
Still, Bismarck had to make elaborate appeals to
William I to achieve a reluctant acceptance of the AustroGerman alliance, a defensive pact aimed primarily at Russia.
He told William that both Andrassy and Francis Joseph viewed
the possibility of a republican France and Imperial Russia,
undermined by Pan-Slavism, joining each other in an alliance
as likely. 16

He further argued that an alliance between

Austria and Germany would be in the interests of the Russian
dynasty in regards to the Balkans and the upholding of the
monarchial system.17

William acquiesced only after the

entire council of state threatened to resign.18

By 1880, a

rapprochement between the three empires had begun.
Bismarck, taking advantage of this development, initiated a
program emphasizing the dangers offered to European peace by
radical movements.

He had to convince Russia and Austria of

the need to stand together in the face of common dangers;
the way to this end was the stressing of the monarchial

15ibid., Bismarck to William I, Aug. 23, 1879; iii, 22.
16Brown, "Monarchial Principle," Historian, 46.
17Grosse Politik, Bismarck to William I, Sept. 5, 1879;
iii, 58.
18ibid.,

Bismarck to William, Oct. 5, 1879; iii, 116.
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principle substantiated further by economic and military
interests. 19
These appeals about the need for monarchial solidarity
against revolution and socialism were indeed very effective
in bringing the three empires back together.

Another area

that this was effective in was the formation of the Triple
Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy in 1882.20

In the

immediate background of this treaty a great deal of
attention was given to the monarchial principle,
appropriately reflected in the preamble:
Their majesties, animated by a secret desire to
increase the guarantees of the general peace, to
fortify the monarchial principle and to insure thereby
the maintenance intact of the social and political
order in the respective states, have agreed to
conclude a treaty which by its essentially
conservative and defensive nature, has for its only
goal to protect them against the dangers which are
able to menace the security of their states and the
repose of Europe.21

This was essentially a revival of the Metternichian system,
and it continued to play an important role in holding the
emperors together in the 1880s.

But while monarchial

principle became more important proportionately towards
German relations with Austria, Russia, and Italy, Bismarck
19Saint-Vallier to Freycinet, March 31, 1880, France,
Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Documents diplomatiques
franca is 1871-1914, 1st series, iii (Paris, 1929-1950), 7273.
20Brown, "Monarc
hial Principle," Historian, 48.
21Grosse Politik
, iii, 245.
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found his policy of supporting French republicanism
embarassing as pressure was brought on him not to oppose the
restoration of the French monarchy.22
During the 1880s, while Bismarck was still using the
wedge of divergent ideologies to keep Russia and France
apart, the French were slowly becoming acceptable to the
tsar and Russian government as both countries turned ever
more suspicious eyes on German motives.

And after

Bismarck's statement to the French ambassador to Berlin, to
the effect that Germany would support only one republic in
Europe, and that would an be Italian republic, it became
increasingly clear to the French government the diplomatic
use Bismarck had made of French republicanism in preventing
alliances hostile to Germany.

Supplementing the increasing

appeal of France to Russia was the shortcoming of the course
after Bismarck was dropped in 1890, and the failure to renew
the Reinsurance Treaty was a crucial turning point.

After

the establishment of the Franco-Russian alliance there were
appeals to the monarchial principle, such as Bjcerkoe in
1905, but never again was it an effective tool in diplomacy
as from 1870 to 1890. 23

More important was the fact that

Germany was no longer the broker of such solidarity.

22ibid., iii; Reuss to Bismarck, Jan. 21, 1884, 313;
Hatzfeldt to Schweinitz, Jan. 26, 1884, 315.
23Brown, "Monarchial Principle," Historian, 52-54.
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The degree to which nationalism remained an issue and
the responsiveness of the German public to patriotic appeals
were of great value to Bismarck in his manipulation of the
European balance of power and domestic forces inside
Germany.

It would be a mistake to attribute more than

convenience of analysis to any separation between Bismarck's
foreign and domestic policies.

At the very least, domestic

and foreign policy exerted reciprocal influence.

Both were

usually conceived together as essential elements of one
scheme, designed to maintain the Prussian monarchy, the
hegemony of a Prussian controlled Germany in Europe, and the
German control over European alignments, with Bismarck at
the head of it all.

His titles of imperial chancellor,

prime minister, and minister of Prussia symbolized the
interconnection of his interests.24

This interconnection

found an expression from the start of the Reich.

Bismarck

was sincere when he described Germany as a satiated nation,
and he was determined to follow a cautious course in foreign
policy to preserve the staus quo favorable to Germany, both
outwardly and inwardly.25
To this end, Bismarck turned to the Prussian
aristocracy, i.e. the Army.

The Bismarkian Empire and the

24Hans Rosenberg, Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit.
Wirtschaftsablauf, Gesellschaft und Politik in Mitteleuropa
(Berlin, 1967), 262-265.
25Gordon A. Craig, Europe since 1815 (New York, 1961),
271.
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Prussian army formed an indissoluble entity.

Bismarck

believed his greatest achievement was winning over the king
of Prussia and the Prussian army to the ideal of a
nationally unified Germany.

Bismarck thought the failure of

the 1848 revolutions lay in the fact that the middle classes
sought to establish the empire with their own strength,
regardless of the German dynasties or the historic role of
Prussia.26

Bismarck took to a different course.

He united

the military aristocracy of Prussia with the German middle
class, placed the Hohenzollerns at the head of it all, and
gave

Reich its new rulers.

The agrarian and military,

the dynastic and bureaucratic, an

even clerical elements

still made up the bulwark of German strength.27

And behind

the middle class lay the urban proletariat, ready to fight
along side the middle class against the aristocracy, and yet
a very conservative class.

Under these circumstances

Bismarck believed it possible to reconcile the middle class
with the old ruling class.

His means to this end were the

achievement of national unity through class cooperation

26Walter M. Simon, Germany in the Age of Bismarck (New
York, 1968), 51-52, 77.
27Bismarck's sociological conception is expressed in
Gedanken und Errinerungen, ii (Berlin, 1922), 59:
"The greater caution of the more intelligent classes
may likely arise from the materialistic basis of
property preservation .... but for the security and
advancement of the state, it is more useful to have a
majority of those who represent property." For
Bismarck's views on the necessary cooperation between
agriculture, industry, and trade, see his speech of
July 9, 1893, in Friederichsruh.
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while at the same time raising a strong bulwark against
socialism.

But for the Reich of Bismarck to fail, neither

the opposition of the working class nor of the middle class
was necessary.

The new Reich was mortally ill from birth.

Military victories and prosperity barely concealed the fact
that Bismarck was unable to mold the differing elements of
the German people into one organic whole, nor did he ever
attempt to do so.

He was successful in building at least an

alliance between the political aristocracy and the
industrial middle class.

But only the superimposed strength

of the Reich in this form held together the classes and
forces at war within Germany.

Up to 1890, Bismarck's power

and imperial authority were one in the same.

It is often

said that Bismarck's successors ruined his creation; that is
true only in so far as the Bismarckian Empire could not
exist without Bismarck.28

Only he understood its exact

meaning and the true purposes behind its institutions and
composition.

Later statesmen misunderstood completely the

nature of the system.
The German Empire was not doomed to fail because it
arose from a compromise between the middle class and the
Prussian aristocracy, but because it embodied that
compromise in the form of almost complete autocracy.

To

avoid having to hand over his authority to the imperial
chancellor, the King of Prussia was by necessity an

28ibid., 59-60.
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autocrat.

That Bismarck bound up the political life of the

German nation with his own person, indeed with his own
personal relationship to William I and the constitution he
created, was an incalcuable historical mistake.

Yet at the

time of the establishment of the Reich, the liberal middle
class was the intellectual, commercial, and the industrial
leader of German society.

The vast masses of manual

laborers and lower middle classes, the great majority of the
factory workers, even a considerable part of the peasantry
and a few of the nobility, adopted the nationalist and
liberal ideals of the middle class and did service to its
mottos.29

In opposition to this powerful force stood the

Prussian army, the Kaiser, the corps of officers, the
hierarchy of the Prussian bureaucracy, the territorial
landlords east of the Elbe, a group of liberal nobles, and
the agrarian population dependent upon their landlords.

How

could a compromise be achieved between these forces?
What was Bismarck attempting to accomplish with his
policies?

Did he view the divergent social and foreign

policy interests as compatible in some way, or was he simply
holding together a miscarriage?

Social and domestic,

foreign and commercial, as well as military interests and
policies were all wrapped up in Bismarck's scheme of
reconstruction, based on conservative and monarchial
principles.

Here was the Europe in which Bismarck

29ibid., 63-65.
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envisioned Germany could survive.

Germany could not, in his

view, survive between monarchist, republican, and socialist
forces.

His alliance system sought to build monarchial

blocks which were much more able to dealing with other
monarchial nations rather than the radical movements
spreading through Europe.

Bismarck's Germany worked only

because it waz, constituted of a conservative ruling class
with monarchial and imperial aspirations.

By sympathies, it

was prone to dealing with monarchies. By 1878 Bismarck
envisioned his Germany, the new monarchial power in central
Europe, leading the bloc of other conservative monarchs
against a socialist tide.

Just as Metternich led the

monarchies of Europe, and just as his alliances failed in
the end to preserve his power over Europe, so too did
Bismarck's.

Nowhere is this better demonstrated than in the

Chancellor's dealings with France and Russia.

Barely had the Triple Alliance been concluded when
international colonialism spread to Africa.

Germany, now

awash with a new sense of power, answered the call to
imperialism enthusiastically.
allowing this.

Bismarck had motives for

Despite his opposition, he had to conform

eventually to dominant trends in German society and

•
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thought."

More important was the state of German society

in the 1880s.

Economic, political, and nationalistic forces

were not only strong enough to render colonial expansion
feasilble, but even necessary in the eyes of the ruling
classes.

Industrial expansion demanded raw materials and

new markets.

The founding of the Reich had created a

nationalistic pride and self-confidence.

Furthermore, the

need was felt by the aristocracy and industrialists to
divert the emerging working class's attention from domestic
affairs with colonial ventures.

All these factors were

justification for `Weltpolitik' in 1896.31

The importance

of this short spell of colonial expansion cannot be judged
by the small territorial acquisitions made, but by its
function as a dress rehearsal for the actual 'Weltpolitik' a
decade or so later.

Thus, when searching for Bismarck's

motives for a colonial policy, several explanations can be
offered: a favorable position in foreign policy; likewise in
domestic policy; and a socio-economic structure connected to
emerging imperialism.

Knowing

Bismarck's flexibility, it

may be presumed that all three factors influenced the
Chancellor.32

However, the interpretation that he had

"Mary E. Townsend, ME 7-dse and Fall of Germany's
Colonial Empire (New York, 1930), 40-47.
31H.-U. Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus
(Cologne, West Germany, 1969), 75-33.
32ibid., 84.
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always wanted and actively sought colonies is definitely
wrong.
In July 1879, Bismarck for the first time took interest
in colonialism through sponsorship of the Samoa Bill.
Bismarck called for the takeover of plantations and
settlements from the bankrupt Hamburg company in Samoa,
saving the interests of the firm with Reich funds to
preserve German trade.

Despite his efforts, the Reichstag

rejected the Samoa Bill in 1880.
mainly the Liberals.

Those opposing it were

But during this struggle a colonial

movement in Germany began to emerge.

Not until 1685 would

the Reichstag accept the notion of support for colonial
ventures using Reich funds, after the long-tern effect of
the depression following 1873 reduced its confidence in free
trade.33
By 1880, the "scramble for Africa" spread to
international dimensions.

France advanced along the Niger,

took Tunisia, and began expansion to central Africa by 1882.
In the same year Britain occupied Egypt.

Germany's ruling

classes decided that precedents abroad were strong enough to
allow their sharing in the colonial pie.

The model based on

the Samoa Bill was applied wherever possible.

Private

claims were placed under the protection of the German
Empire.

Between April 1884 and May 1885, Germany took over

33H. Boehme, Deutschlands Weg zur Grossmacht (Cologne,
1966), 474-604.
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its most important colonial posessions.

In April 1884,

Luederitz Bay fell under the German sphere.

In July, Togo

and the Cameroons became colonial acquisitions.

In

February, 1885, German East Africa, or Tanzinia, was
acquired.

Finally, in May 1885, the Reich took over the

north of New Guinea.

This sudden spurt of colonialism was

only possible due to favorable positions in domestic and
foreign policy.34
The material effects of the German colonies remained
marginal throughout the life of the Reich.

Investments were

slight since colonies were expected to pay their own way.
Most of what Germany invested was for military installations
and railways.

German colonial methods mixed paternalism,

inexperience, arrogance, exploitation, and racism, all of
which naturally led to large scale revolts.

Besides the

troubles of governing the colonies, however, was the fact
that they did not supply sufficient amounts of raw materials
to even justify their existence.

The real material

significance of these colonies for German foreign policy was
that the Weltpolitik of 1896 received a material basis
through colonial possessions.

And being less dangerous than

continental aspirations, they represented a challenge of
further colonial unification.

And if colonial acquisition

did not create special problems in foreign policy, the
colonial question could always be used later as a diplomatic

34 ibid., 503.
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lever against Britain or France.

France could be diverted

from Alsace-Lorraine and the British could be neutralized
over Egypt or the Anglo-German division of Portugese
colonies in Africa.35
After the initial enthusiasm over German colonial
expansion had subsided and it became clear that the colonies
were not destined to become economically prosperous, Germany
realized that the colonies represented the ruins of the more
grandiose scheme of a more permanent challenge to fulfill an
African colonial bloc, or Mittelafrika.

The colonies also

served as an additional pretext for the building of a strong
fleet and naval bases all over the world following
Bismarck's rule. Bismarck, knowing the danger of openly
challenging Britain, would not have approved.36

Yet

Bismarck's colonial machinations were not enough to stem the
change occurring in Europe.
Bismarck's last five years as Chancellor have
traditionally been regarded as the climax of his European
statesmanship.

By 1887, his consolidation of Germany as a

latent hegemonial power was completed.

The Reinsurance

Treaty with Russia and the Mediterranean Entente were
witness to this.

In reality, however, the Chancellor was

juggling new treaties with every step, hoping to postpone
35H. Bley, Southwest Africa under German Rule 1894-1914
(London, 1971), 121-129.
36Grosse Politik, Herbert Bismarck to Buelow, Apr. 17,
1909; x, 297.
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the breakdown of the whole of his conception as the threat
of alliance between Russia and France became an ever nearer
possibility.
The Franco-Russian alliance had been foreseen in 1871
as a logical consequence of defeat and the loss of AlsaceLorraine.

France and Russia did not clash in interests or

national borders.

The half-industrialized France had

capital badly needed in a Russia just beginning the
industrial revolution, especially considering the banning of
German loans to Russia in 1887.

Ideological considerations

were secondary to economic and political aims.

This

elementary change in the European diplomatic map came about
because the price of prevention, moderation and drastic
revision of foreign policy, was unthinkable to the new
ruling class.37

The isolation of France failed because of

weak successors and the structure of the Reich itself.
Foreign policy from 1885 to 1890 was nothing but an attempt
to ward off the inevitable.
German power remained as dominant as ever after the
conclusion of colonial expansion in May 1885.

The Alliance

of the Three Emperors was renewed in November 1884, showing
consolidation among the coservative monarchies of Central
and Eastern Europe.

The Salisbury government in England

seemed to offer new hope for improved Anglo-German

37A. Hillgruber, Bismarcks Aussenpolitik (Freiburg,
1972), 179-81.
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relations.

But two months after the British change of

government, Bismarck's system suffered heavy blows from the
East and West.38
Important stipulations of the Congress of Berlin
concerning the Balkans came to naught with the agreements
between Bulgaria and East Rumelia.

The resulting Serbo-

Bulgarian conflict drew Russia to the support of Bulgaria
and Austria to the aid of Serbia.

This confrontation

finally destroyed any monarchial solidarity remaining.

The

renewing of any pact between the three emperors was out of
the question.

Russia was now free for other alignments.

Short-term agreements, such as the Reinsurance Treaty, were
Bismark's only recourse.

The argument that Germany could

restrain the Austrians or Russians in a crisis continued to
work.
The continuing Bulgarian crisis brought Germany to the
undesirable position of having to choose between Russia and
Austria.
made.

By his own system, Bismarck's choice was already

To support Austria would upset the balance of his

system.

Vienna and London demanded a pledge from Berlin to

oppose Russian advances toward the Straits.
was awkward for Germany.

The situation

To oppose Russia would provoke a

Franco-Russian coalition, and Bismarck did not want to
become Britain's agent of Russian opposition on the
continent.

Instead, the Chancellor wanted Britain to do the

38ibid., 185-87.
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blocking so that Germany would not risk a war with a FrancoRussian coalition.

This complicated situation gave rise to

the completion of Bismarck's alliance system in the
Reinsurance Treaty and the Mediterranean Entente.
were only desperate measures.39

But these

With the cancelling of

Russian loans in November 1887, coupled with the raising of
agrarian tariffs in March 1887, blocking effective Russian
military action in the Balkans, Russia was driven into the
French camp.

From 1888 onwards, Russia would look to Paris

to satisfy her financial demands."

This financial

partnership was the beginning of the political alliance
between Russia and France.

It is ironic that Bismarck's rescue of the Prussian
monarchy resulted in his own fall.

The conflict between

Bismarck and the Kaiser was due largely to their
irreconcilable temperments and totally different outlooks.
Bismarck still clung to the old ways, having grown old and
stubborn; William, young, shrewd, but impulsive and
unstable, looked to the future where he was master of the

Langer, Deutschlands Weg zur Grossmacht, 387-392.
40Grosse Politik, doc. 1137-43.
For a discussion of
the economic and political mechanisms within the context of
German foreign policy toward Russia in that period, see H
Boehme, "Politik und Oekonomie in der Reichsgrundungszeit
und spaeten Bismarck-Zeit" in M. Stuermer, ed., Das
Kaiserliche Deutschland, 26, 40-8.
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state.

Germany was now divided -- those who held to

Bismarck and those who chose to flatter the new master.41
The Kaiser controlled the army and promotions, was
completely autocratic in Prussia, and had the complete
allegiance of the military command.

Bismarck still held a

great deal of civilian power and a parliamentary majority,
though the Junkers supported the Kaiser, but in a time when
constitutional means and parliamentary decisions were
becoming of less and less concern to the entire nation.
Bismarck had easily controlled William I.

On William's

death in 1888, his son Friederich assumed the throne though
striken with cancer of the larnyx.

He ruled only 93 days.

Friederich's son, William II, was determined to rule.

More

than any other constitutional ruler of modern times, he was
convinced of his divine right to rule, and was quite
intolerant of anyone who stood in his way.

His aim was not

dismissal of Bismarck, but a gradual takeover of the aging
Chancellor's powers.

Sudden dismissal would bring about

adverse public opinion harmful to the new reign.
But Bismarck was not about to give up his power easily.
He tightened his grip on the ministries and the Reichstag to
stop any monarchial interference.

Had the game remained so,

with each side countering the other, a stalemate of years
might have resulted and been tolerated.

But Bismarck sought

41Fay, "Germany under Bismarck and his Successors,"
Current History, 28, 214.
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measures to permanently hamper the Kaiser,42

and here

William "dropped the pilot."
Bismarck's final failure at the end of his career was a
lack of

appreciation for William's desire to be the actual

pilot of the state ship.

The role Bismarck had always

played for the Kaiser the Kaiser wanted back.

Clumsily,

Bismarck tried to stop the Kaiser, first by attempting to
disrupt William's plans for an international labor
conference and then by reimposing the old Cabinet Order of
1852, which forbade the ministers to address the Kaiser
without the permission and presence of the prime minister.
The Kaiser perceived such acts as indiscretions against
his own person and believed he could use them to control
Bismarck.

In a conversation with the Chancellor on 15 March

1890, William reproached him for keeping his Kaiser in the
dark in placing barriers between him and his ministers,
demanded the full recall of the 1852 order, and attacked
Bismarck for discussions with the Centre Party lead,c!rship
without William's knowledge or consent.

William also

expressed concern over his lack of information on RussoGerman relations, which were steadily decaying.43

42John C. Roehl, Germany without Bismarck: the Crisis
of Government in the Second Reich, 1890-1900 (Los Angeles,
1967), 25-27.
43John C. Roehl, "Staatsstreichplan oder
Staatsstreichbereitschaft? Bismarcks Politik in der
Entlassungskrise," Historische Zeitschrift, 203 (1966), 61516.
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Truthfully, he had never liked the Reinsurance Treaty nor
cared considerably for the state of Russian relations.
Also, the fact that Friederich von Holstein had long been
associated with Bismarck does not dismiss the fact that he
contributed greatly to the Chancellor's fall.

Holstein did

not take Bismarck's side on the major issues at hand and
even warned the Kaiser of the danger of Bismarck's policy.
After this incident, Bismarck realized that any plans
to solve the domestic and foreign crises could only be
abandoned and that his position as Chancellor could no
longer continue.

Hoping to out-bluff William as he had his

grandfather, Bismarck tendered his resignation four days
later, but William accepted, and so the `Iron and Blood
Chancellor' left the Wilhelmstrasse.44

He retired to his

estates at Friederichsruh, tired, bitter, blaming William
for all, and even subject to radical movements himself.
memoirs are even more embittered and show how he alone
accomplished Germany's creation.

44ibid., 616-21.

His

Chapter II
New Leaders, Old Policies, and Pressure Groups

Frederich William Victor Albert was his christened
name; officially he reigned as William II.

As his mother

often attested, the young William was never at peace unless
occupied in some manner with something.

Such behavior,

exhibited all his life, led to fateful errors for his realm.
Though he posessed an above average intelligence for a
European monarch, William squandered this asset with lack of
discipline, self-indulgence, and too much time spent overcompensatin2, for physical deficiency.45 And despite being a
constitutional monarch, William perceived of himself as a
divine right ruler.

His intention concerning Bismarck was

not immediate usurption of his power, but instead a gradual
reduction of the aging Chancellor's duties.

However,

Bismarck's continual struggle against William over matters
of policy led to his resignation as Chancellor.46

The loss

of such a stabalizing force as Bismarck was a hallmark of
William and his age.
Physically deformed from birth47 and having suffered a

45Craig, Germany. 1866-1945, 224-225.
46Rohl, Germany without Bismarck., 27.
47The left side of Wiiliam's body was not truly
This
deformed, but withered and weaker than his right side.
was not uncommon among royalty at the time due to the close
inbreeding among the houses of Europe. Whatever the cause,
this deficiency had a profound effect on William. He felt
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severe Calvinist upbringing, he was most certainly insecure.
Yet his public utterances stressed, disturbingly often, his
own importance.

He intervened whenever and wherever he

wanted, harbored strong racialist tendencies, linked more to
popular trends than anything else, and exhibited a taste for
things obscene.

The other side of this personality was a

man who could be exceedingly charming.

Many men of state,

including Bismarck and Caprivi, were not opposed to him
before actually having to deal with him.
charm kept enemies off balance.

His disarming

However, many persons in

the Foreign Office and government who did not have direct
contact with the Kaiser idealized him.

Those on more

intimate terms with the Kaiser, such as Philipp Eulenberg,
whom he trusted fully beacause they agreed with him on
everything, came to influence him to a great extent.48
These influences became even more critical as his reign
progressed, for they determined his thinking as much as he
did.

He never applied himself to study, nor did he learn

the basic domestic and international facts of political
life.

Unable to apply himself to work as work instead of as

he must always hide weakness. He developed a forceful
personality to counter his feelings of inferiority and
fancied himself a military leader, always dressing militarystyle and surrounding himself with military figures, as part
of his masquerade. He led his own calvary regiment and rode
with them in exercise to impress the crowds. The deficiency
also led to his grandiose imagination concerning Germany's
mission in the world, which rubbed off on the German people.
48ibid., 28-31.
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an outlet for his own self-assurance, he was constantly
travelling, hunting, or cruising the North Sea.49
A disproportionate amount of his working time was
devoted to military matters.

The predominance of the

military in his councils was extraordinary, finally
culminating in a unification of the maison militaire with a
Commandant of Headquaters who accompanied William on trips.
This marked the further disintergration of actual military
unity and the introduction of another influential power into
the crumbling and chaotic structure of the government.
Previously, the military had worked within its own
professional circle.

Strategy was supported by the Kaiser

but not subject to him.

Though politicized for some time,

the Army now had to deal increasingly in politics.

Not only

did this complicate domestic affairs for the ministers even
more, but greatly disrupted foreign policy, a field in which
William was convinced he had a special talent and a Godgiven mission.50

The Kaiser's illusion on this had been

greatly increased by Holstein, who advised the Kaiser in
order to further his own policies.

49Craig, Germany 1866-1945, 225.
50Gordon Craig, Politics of the Prussian Army. 16401945 (Oxford, 1955), 238-40. See Norman Rich, Holstein, 1
(london, 1965), 243ff for a detailed discussion of
Holstein's influence on the Kaiser.
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As early as December 1889 Tsar Alexander III, hoping to
insure German neutrality in the Balkans, approved renewal of
the Reinsurance Treaty.

Negotiations were planned to resume

for April, but the Bismarck crisis convinced Ambassador
Count Paul Shuvalov to take the matter up earlier.

On his

own initiative, he raised the subject with Bismarck on 10
February.

The Chancellor agreed to immediate negotiations

and suggested the indefinite continuation of the treaty.
William was informed and gave his consent,51 but the fact of
the matter was that William did not trust the Russians and
did not care whether the treaty was renewed or not.
Shuvalov left for St. Petersburg on 27 February,
returning to Berlin on 17 March, the day before Bismarck
handed in his resignation.

Alexander had empowered Shuvalov

to renew the treaty for six years, but the loss of Bismarck
in the diplomatic arena caused Shuvalov to suspend
negotiations until a successor was chosen.

The Kaiser

interpreted this as meaning the Russians would only deal
with a Bismarck and, if one was not the Chancellor, then
Russia would be forced to denounce the agreement.52
Obviously, there was some maneuvering on the part of Herbert
Bismarck to insure the chancellorship to himself or his
father.

Otherwise the inference was that the Kaiser would

51William L. Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance. 18901894 (Cambridge, Mass., 1929), 40; Grosse Politik, VII, 3,
Herbert Bismarck to William II, Berlin, 20 March 1890, no.1366.
52ibid., no.1366-1367.
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have to bear the burden of the break with Russia.
William did not take the hint.

But

He spoke with Shuvalov over

breakfast, maintaining that even without Bismarck he was
intent on the same course and ready to renew the treaty.
After the resignation of Herbert Bismarck, William
instructed Caprivi to continue negotiations.

The public

statements of the Kaiser indicated the continuance of the
policy.53
Caprivi called a meeting for a select group of the
Foreign Ministry personnel for 23 March before coming to a
decision on the treaty.

Those attending, besides Caprivi,

were Ludwig von Raschdau, Freidrich von Holstein, and Count
von Berchem.
the treaty.

The unanimous opinion was against renewal of
Berchem summarized the reasoning in a

memorandum on 24 March, stating that support of Russia's
Balkan aspirations only encouraged war there, was contrary
to the Meditteranean Entente, and several other points.
After consulting with Lothar von Schweinitz and J.M. von
Radowitz, who agreed with Holstein on every issue, the
matter was left up to William.

He was being asked to

abandon what he had encouraged only a week before.

More

concerned over the implications of conflict with yet another

53Norman Rich, Friedrich von Holstein: Politics and
Diplomacy in the Er4_2f_Biutarck and William II (Cambridge,
1965), I, 310.
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Chancellor, William threw the chance of renewal of the
Reinsurance Treaty away.54
Despite the decision to abandon the renewal on 27
March, Russia's foreign minister Nicholas de Giers still
tried to reach some kind of agreement with Germany.
Russia the decision meant isolation.

For

The severance of the

link with Vienna to discuss Balkan issues and relations
solely depended on the goodwill of the Hohenzollerns and
Habsburgs toward the Romanovs.

Germany ignored all of the

offers of Giers except the last, which only sought an
exchange of promises to maintain relations despite changes
in government.
relations.

To refuse it would severely damage future

The old argument that Germany should refrain

from any written agreements in order to protect the Triple
Alliance dealt the final blow to any possible renewal of the
Reinsurance Treaty.55

Giers, after several further

attempts, finally abandoned hope of gaining written
commitments from Germany.
The most telling result of the German decision was its
move toward closer relations with Vienna, a move which had
been building momentum since 1879.

However, Vienna still

54Grosse Politik, VII, 3, Berchem Memorandum, Berlin,
25 March, 1890, no.1368; see also Nichols, Germany After
Bismarck, 54-55.
For a further discussion on this meeting
see Langer, Franco-Russian Alliance, 50-51, and Rich,
Holstein, I, 311-313.
55Grosse Politik, VII, 12-22, Schweinitz to Caprivi,
St. Petersburg, April 3 - May 16, 1890; Hans Jakobs, Die
Franzoesisch-Russischen Zweibundes (Berlin, 1964), 24.
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chose a more independent course towards solving its problems
in the Balkans in agreements with Great Britain or a direct
understanding with Russia.

Austria was probably even

willing to sacrifice the Triple Alliance to arrive at
decisions with these two powers, a thought which greatly
disturbed the German Foreign Ministry.

In committing to

Vienna, Germany was giving support to Austria in the
volatile Balkans.

With its new ties to Austria, its

courtship of British support, and its shortsighted dismissal
of the Reinsurance Treaty, Germany had changed the European
diplomatic scene from one of relative stability to one of
instability and conflict.
The series of events leading to the dropping of the
Reinsurance Treaty would indicate that German foreign policy
was undergoing a basic change.

Previously offensive, it now

assumed a defensive character.

Stability within and defense

of the Triple Alliance became the main concerns.

Most

notable were two results of this change of posture: the
strategic Heligoland Treaty with England on 1 July 1890 and
the modest rapprochement with France.

Both these instances

were designed to maintain the Austrian and Italian
alliances.

Yet it defense was the key, then alliance with

Austria placed Germany in the direct path of Russia in the
Balkans.

This had always been the case, but now there was

no Bismarck to guide German policy.

This was perhaps

defensive for short-term purposes, but could not remain
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defensive as the Balkans became more and more volatile.
Officials in Berlin totally ignored the effect that
nonrenewal would have in Russia.

To those in St. Petersburg

it seemed to confirm that William was anti-Russian.

Thus

Russia would have found it difficult to believe any
assurances of peace from Berlin.56
treaty indicates two points:

The breakdown of the

that Caprivi's administration,

at least in the early days, believed it was following
Bismarck's policy, and in fact never had any intention of
departing from it; and Bismarckian policy meant assurance of
the Triple Alliance to the new men in Berlin and the German
people.

With the possibility of any Russian agreement behind
them and England having become the center of diplomatic
attention, Germany adopted a policy of open options, as many
as possible, to improve Russian relations while maintaining
efforts in London.
impatient.

German public opinion, however, was

Germans needed new conquests.

With this in

mind, the Foreign Ministry set on a course of invigoration
of foreign policy with overseas ventures.

This was much

more a show to quiet public dissatisfaction than a wellreasoned policy and was actually a resumption of the
Bismarokian policy, the only difference being that the

56J. Alden Nichols, Germany After Bismarck: the Caprivi
Era, 1890-1894 (Cambridge, 1958), 59-62.
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policy toward France had changed.

The main author of the

policy was Paul Kayser, head of the Colonial Section of the
Foreign Ministry.

His theory was that overseas ventures

would gain favor among those Germans dissatisfied with the
Anglo-German agreement of 1890 and who showed interest in
colonial matters.

By any measure this encompassed very few

in the average population.

But to business, nationalists,

and the pressure groups it was popular.

Such a policy would

allow prestige, profit, and, with Germany acting as mediator
for its own interests, German meddling in a broader range of
colonial matters.

As long as no one's vital interests were

not involved, the policy would not be dangerous.
The reason this policy increased opportunity in colonial
matters was also its basic flaw.

The system had no logical

plan or conclusion, but instead waited for something to
happen before a decision was made as to what action was to
be taken.

This was crisis diplomacy.

Considering the

uncertainty which other nations felt as to German
intentions, this was the worst possible policy to adopt.

It

threatened complications with the British because Britain
was the largest colonial power.

Both Kayser and William II

saw the policy as a way to curb public opinion concerning
weakness in facing Britain while Holstein regarded it as
letting the British know it would be best to have Germany as
a friend and uphold the Triple Alliance.

Holstein's policy

toward England was one of cultivating closer relations not
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only between Germany and England, but also between England
and the Triple Alliance.

Hatzfeldt, however, complained

that the whole idea was inconsistent and would force the
British away instead of drawing them nearer, as well as
drive the French and Russians closer together.

The case of

the British alienation was even more severe since the policy
involved colonial acquisitions and possessions.

If England

stood to lose anything important it would certainly develop
grave suspicions as to German motives.

This was in fact the

case, as the rejection of the Roseberry government's offer
over Samoan posessions in 1894 widened the gulf between
Britain and the Triple Alliance.57
Despite the warnings of seasoned diplomatic veterans such
as Hatzfeldt, Germany went after new colonial aquisitions as
enthusiastically as it had in the 1880s.
as a sole possession,58

Samoa was claimed

British agreements in the Congo

were protested, and quarrels with the British over a variety
of colonial matters erupted.

Even the ascension of

Hohenlohe - an old, tired, but extremely able man - to the
Chancellorship in 1894 did nothing to ease the tension or

57Raymond J. Sontag, Germany and England: the
Background of Conflict, 1848-1894 (New York, 1939), 284-290.
58A treaty of 1889 held that Samoa was to be governed
by the United States, Great Britain, and Germany.
The March
1894 insurrection led Germany to believe the U.S. wished to
withdraw, and thus Germany requested British withdrawal also
to make a favorable impression on the German public. See
Paul Kennedy, The Samoan Tangle: A Study in Anglo - German American Relations, 1878-1900 (New York, 1974), 108, for
further discussion.
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decrease colonial activities.

Eighteen ninety-five saw the

beginning of German meddling in the Far East (suspicious of
British seizure of Shanghai and Russian moves toward the
Dardanelles) and friction over the Transvaal.

In the

latter, Anglo-German relations nearly collapsed over the
Jameson Raid, led by Dr. Leander Starr Jameson, which
attempted to overthrow the government of President Paul
Kruger in the Transvaal.

On this account Germany was not

wholly without justification in its reactions of
indignation, for the British did take on an attitude of
superiority in regard to the situation.

Yet even if

jusitifed, German actions were undiplomatic, insulting, and
threatening.

And, as always, German motives and long-term

policies were vague.59
The Transvaal Crisis of 1896, heightened by the Jameson
Raid of 1895, provide insight into the deficiencies of
German diplomacy.

The Transvaal was independent, though

still requiring British permission to conclude treaties.
German monopolies in the National Bank, importation, and
domestic production for exportation, as well as exportation
itself, controlled 20 percent of the foreign capital
invested in the country.

British control over foreign

policy in the region, coupled with the event of the Jameson
Raid - a prime excuse for getting a foot in the door - could

59Sontag, Germany and England, 294; Grosse Politik,
VIII, 129-33, 452, 455-7, 463.
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not be viewed indifferently in Germany.

Hatzfeldt in London

was ordered to inquire if the raid was the result of British
sponsorship, and if so, to break off diplomatic ties
immediately.

The answer to the inquiry was negative, but

the Kaiser, having taken over personal control of the
affair, flew into a rage.

He proposed drastic action, such

as sending troops and establishing a protectorate over the
Transvaal.
unbalanced.

Even his Chancellor considered him mentally
To prevent any drastic action, a telegram from

the Kaiser to Krueger was sent, congratulating him on
repulsing foreign advances.

This was extremely inflammatory

to the British, since the use of the word "foreign" in the
text of the telegram still implied British involvement.

The

public reaction in Britain reflected the intense anti-German
feeling growing on the popular level, not just in the
British Foreign Office."

The entire situation had served

only to widen the Anglo-German gap, draw France closer to
Russia, and became yet another failure of German foreign
policy.

It was also seen as a personal failure by the

Kaiser.

Public opinion in Germany, however, differed greatly from
the actuality of the situation.

The people most interested

"William Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (New
York, 1951), 219-242.
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in foreign policy applauded the Krueger telegram.

The press

loved it; Colonial Leagues and the Pan-German League praised
the government's resolution in the matter.

These domestic

groups completely missed the point that since the loss of
the Russian alliance the instability of German policy on the
domestic level had been deteriorating Germany's foreign
position.

The press hailed the Triple Alliance as solid,

indefatigable, and praised the new course as the awakening
of German policy from the darkness of the Caprivi Ministry
and the return of a more aggressive Bismarkian policy.

This

course, incidently, fit perfectly with the new industrial
might of the Reich.
The system would seem, and should have seemed, clear to
any observer.
recognition.

The whole of German society desired
This was, for Germany, the main driving force

of politics and foreign policy in the last decade of the
nineteenth century.

Society's aspirations and expectations

coincided with an expanding capitalist economy.
of industry and society had one common goal:
Germany from a European to a world power.61

The leaders

to reform
To redirect

this force, only one element was needed, and it was the one
thing Germany, with all its industrial might and politically
vigorous self-assuredness, could not produce.

This was

quite simply a cautious, but not necessarily brilliant, man

61J.H. Clapham, The Economic Development of France and
Germany. 1815-1914 (4th ed., London, 1963), 393.

45
who could see the ludicrousness of the German course and
would have worked to bring about a consistent, sane policy
sufficient for German needs.
Despite the capitalist transformation of German society
and the growing influence, indeed predominance, of industry
in the economy, political power remained in the hands of the
Junkers.

The Junkers had only partially molded with the

urban middle class.

To remain in power, the landed interest

needed political allies who could extend its diminishing
economic base.

Here the concept of Sammlungspolitik was

born, referring to the defensive alliance of the capitalists
and the landowners, two groups united by fear of foreign
competition and democratic reform.

This coalition had its

roots as early as 1848, but several factors in the 1870s
brought it to fruition:

the national question had been

solved, if only temporarily; the depression of 1873 had set
in with devastating effects to the economy, but even more to
the ruin of German industry; and finally, the rise of an
organized urban proletariat.

The Bismarckian settlement of

protective tariffs and Anti-Socialist Law in 1878-9 marked
the appearance of this political coalition, and excepting
for the disruption of the Caprivi Chancellorship, carried
Sammlungspolitik into the next century.62

62For a better understanding of the foundations and
overall history of this coalition the major sources are Hans
Rosenberg, Grosse Depression und Bismarckszeit:
Wirtschaftsablauf, Gesellschaft und Politik in Mitteleuropa
(Berlin, 1967) and Helmut Bohme, Deutschlands Weg zur
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Sammlungspolitik in 1897 and the newly proclaimed
Weltpolitik of the new Hohenlohe Chancellorship were,
assuredly, connected by more than a protectionist impulse.
They both lent themselves to the more aggressive pursuit of
German world interests, embodied in the First Navy Bill and
the siezure of Kiao-Chow.

The system instituted within the

coalition was one of mutual benefits, politically and
economically, between the industrial and agrarian sectors.
Eckart Kehr, who has already been mentioned in connection
with this particular theory and was its leading exponent,
put the argument in this form:

"for industry the f)eet,

Weltpolitik and expansion, for the agrarians the tariffs and
the upholding of the social supremacy of the Conservatives,
and as a consequence of this social and economic compromise,
for the Centre Party the political hegemony."63

In

political terms, the aristocracy would remain in political
power supported by the industrialists, and the political
party representing this dominant political force would be
the Centre Party.
Thus, as the coalition grew and blossomed new branches,
or pressure groups centered around specific interests (such
as the Navy League) or more general movements (PanGermanism), the situation in Germany began to entrench

Grossmacht: Studien zum Verhaeltnis von Wirtschaft und Staat
wac.hrend der Reichsgrundungzeit 1848-1881 (Cologne, 1966).
63Eckart Kehr, Schachttlottenbau und Parteipolitik
1894-1901 (Berlin, 1930), 217.
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itself.

Neither the concept of Primat der Innenpolitik nor

its opposite of Primat der Aussenpolitik may satisfactorily
explain, separately or together, the movement of the German
states in the 1890s without the realization that German
foreign policy resulted not from a two-way street between
pressure groups and government in which the government made
foreign policy, but from a triangle connecting the German
government, German pressure groups, and foreign powers.

Any

action was interpreted as good or bacl by the pressure
groups; the wait-and-see policy of the government was now
coupled with a popular front, whose mottos were espoused
enthusiastically by the press, which determined policy when
it was finally made toward a given situation.

The resulting

reaction of a foreign power to the course of action dictated
to the German government by inside pressure came full back
to these domestic forces, thus beginning another round of
jackboot diplomacy and political action.

Such a system was

perpetual in the sense that all that was needed to keep it
going was a third partner, or foreign power (should we hold
to the German mind set and say adversary?), and there
existed a bountiful supply of these considering the policy
of waiting for situations to arise and then deciding policy.
This was what historians today consider Krisepolitik, but in
actual operation it was

much more complex when it is

observed that from every point of the triangle, action could
be initiated.

For example, while it is true that political

410k
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pressure became the engine to German foreign policy, it is
equally true that the government had its own motives, its
own little auxiliary engine, to kick start a series of
actions and reactions.

Even Bismarck had made sure there

were crises when the army estimates were proposed.

In 1892,

the Caprivi government laid before the Reichstag a bill
which called for sizeable increases in the army.

This was

done in reaction to the Rosebery government's isolation
policy toward the Triple Alliance.

The government justified

the bill by raising the threat of two-front war before the
German people.

This not only ensured passage of the bill,

but also turned public opinion against Britain, now seen as
unreliable."

And, of course, any British action would be

taken as unfriendly and would set the course of action back
to the German government.
was reversible.

The chain of reaction and action

The inconsistency of this policy scared

everyone outside of the Triple Alliance and even one of its
own members, Italy, whose weakness made the possibility of a
continental war a dreadful thought.

"Sontag, Germany and England, 258; Eckart Kehr,
Economic Interests Militarism, and Foreign Policy: Essays
on German History, ed. Gordon Craig (Berke)y, 1977), chaps.
and 2.

The Pan-German League was the result of a split of the
old Colonial Society in 1887, which itself was an uneasy
union between the Colonial League of 1882 and the Society
for German Colonization of 1884.

Established in 1891 as the

General German League, the name was changed in 1894 to the
Pan-German League.

The leader of the League, the prodigal

son of German nationalism, was Carl Peters.

The League's

later aims certainly outgrew its original colonial aims, and
its foundation brought something new to the German political
state:

a group which was consistently nationalistic.

This

entailed a set policy or a developing one toward domestic
and foreign issues (of course, however, the League chose to
concentrate only on foreign issues).

Its policy was vague,

with no truly defined long-term interests, and called for
the establishment of German power on a broader basis.

Most

of its endeavors centered on propaganda in colonial issues.
Any defined policy also had to be tied to the economic and
political life of the nation through its membership.

The

League was not just the result of crisis; it intended to
stay.65
The qualities of the Pan-German League which created its
speedy growth were its appeal to the local activists and its

65Geoff Eley, Reshaping the German Right: Radical
Nationalism and Political Change After Bismarck (New Haven,
Conn., 1980), 47-49. Peters was a curious figure. He was a
mixture of trickster, patriot, and Jew baiter. He desired
to imitate British colonial triumphs. His actions in East
Africa did not help to ease Anglo-German tensions and
reserved for him the serious distrust of Bismarck.
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political flexibility in terms of access to politics for
those either opposed to elitist politics or unable to join
its ranks.

It offered non-class based opportunities which

the existing parties did and could not offer.

This appealed

to a far broader range of Germans than the
Honoratiorenpolitik of those parties existing before 1890.
These organizations were occasional, primarily organized
around elections, and had no true contract or procedure
other than the dictates of the class itself (ie, the
wealthy, aristocratic, and nobility).
no local involvement on their part.

There was little or

This left the time

between the elections to the directives of party leadership.
Consequently, when trouble arose these groups were found to
be inadequate to handle the political mobilization of the
mass electorate.

For example, after setbacks in naval

appropriations in the Reichstag in March 1897, measures
backed by the Centre Party but thouroughly opposed by the
socialists, Alfred von Tirpitz enlisted the Pan-Germans and
the Colonial Union as propaganda tools and won massive
popular support for the naval program.

In 1900, the

Reichstag responded with the First Navy Law.
The failures and shortcomings of the old elitist parties
in the face of crisis opened the door to Pan-Germanism.

The

difficulties of political access were made into an ideology
which formed the popular foundations of the League.

Its

politics became that of repudiation of other parties and the
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commitment to only national goals.

Pan-Germanism formed a

surrogate of sorts for those who disliked the conventional
politics and parties, namely the aspiring bourgeosie.

In

another sense, the constitutional structure of the Reich
gave limited power to the Reichstag, but protected the
interests of the Junkers.
often the bureaucracy.

The true source of power was most

This provided another reason for

staying out of the party system as it existed up to 1890.
What the Pan-German League gave such people was

collective

identity, thus making access to and influence on the
government easier for the interests of a conservative,
business-minded middle class and at the same time
threatening the Bismarckian social alliance."
However, the base on which the Pan-German League stood
created its main problem during the 1890s.

Ernst Aasse

the Pan-German Chairman, and Adolf Lehr, the League's
leading member, had rationalized the organization and
administration of the group, but there still existed no
clear political practice nor any notion as to what the
League should be doing.

With no criteria as to outside

domestic political affiliation, the League was at risk of
becoming the refuge of any sort of nationalism.

Pan-

Germanism needed to distance itself from these groups and

56.

52
define its own politics.67

An important issue was needed to

focus the Pan-German attention and specify its purpose and
commitment.

Otherwise, Pan-Germanism would expire from lack

of cohorence and direction.

The appearance of other specialized organizations only
prolonged the uncertainties of the Pan-German League.

Pan-

Germans were finding that cultural ethnicity was not enough
to hold an organization together, particuarly with other
specialized organizations appearing.

Concrete goals

supported by "real" events were needed to give substance to
general principles.

In January 1896, the Krueger Telegram

and the Kaiser's pronouncement of Weltpolitik gave the PanGermans their "real" events.

Pressure was already being

exerted by commercial interests for a stronger navy, with
the Colonial Society even calling for a battlefleet.

Public

discussion of a fleet increased dramatically with the
Jameson Raid.

The Pan-Germans endorsed the idea of

voluntary naval subscription on January 19, one day after
the Kaiser's Weltpolitik speech.

In a very true sense, the

Pan-German League promulgated its own problems in these
actions, mainly due to a lack of close ties with commercial
interests.

67Hasse's opening address to the Eisenbach convention,
25 May, 1902, in Kundgebungen. Beschluesse und Forderungen
des Alldeutschen Verbandes, 1890-1902 (Munich, 1902), 94.
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Compared to the composition of the Pan-Germans, the
German Navy League was a much more cohesive and smaller
group.

It was also more indicative of its time than the

Pan-Germans.

From its beginning, the German Navy was a

place for bourgeosie military careers and advancement
outside the strict class structure of the Prussian Army,
4

where advancement was barred to all not of non-Junker
lineage.

Even the Kaiser recognized their discrimination

and pleaded with the General Staff to adopt a wider spectrum
of eligibility, but to no avail.

The Army, the last refuge

of the Junkers, and its leaders were stubborn.

Thus, not

only did a gap between the Army and Navy widen, but the
Navy, and thus the future Navy League, made its ties
irrevocably with the middle class.

And with the commercial

ties of the middle class, the naval officer and his civilian
cousin were easily brought together.68
The Navy also had social ties to the university
professors, constituted mainly from the middle class.

These

"Flotten Professoren," recognized as some of the best minds
in German academic life, came from every discipline.

But

this relationship ran deeper than affiliation alone.

The

68Kriegswissenschaftliche Abteilung der Marine, Der
Admiralstab der Kaiserlichen Marine, (Bern, 1936), 58. No
chief of the General Staff nor any Minister of War before
1914 was of bourgeoisie origin. The contrast with the Navy
is evident.
Only seven of the fifty-seven admirals and
senior officers of the Admirality Staff from 1899-1918
belonged to the nobility. The pattern in the Imperial Naval
Office was much the same. (Das Reichsmarineamt, Handbuch
fuer das deutsche Reich auf das Jahr 1898 (Berlin, 1898), 193.
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very nature of German intellectualism determined these ties.
A degree of apathy toward western traditions, a strong
suspicion (more a dislike) of absolute values and reason,
and as culmination of state and power were all traits
correspondent to the Navy and the middle class alike.

Along

with a theory of economics which itself was a Darwinian
power struggle (naturally against Britain) and the
popularity of the Mahan Thesis, it is easy to envisage how
academic theories and the call for naval expansion could be
united."

The "Flotten Professoren" provided the academic

foundations and theoretical underpinnings of Weltpolitik, an
essential quality absent among the Pan-Germans and other
socities.70
Though naval societies and leagues existed in Bavaria and
in the Baltic and North Sea coasts by 1890, it was not until
1898 that Alfred Krupp and Prince Wied presented a formal
backing for a Navy League.

On 30 April 1898, the first

meeting of the newly founded German Navy League (Deutscher

"Jonathan Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz
and the Birth of the German Fleet (New York, 1965) 43; see
also W.F. Bruck, Social and Economic History of Germany,
1888-1938 (Cardiff, England, 1938), 37.
70Holger H. Herwig, "Luxury" Fleet: The Imperial German
Navy. 1888-1918 (London, 1980), 40.
Alfred Mahan, a retired
fleet admiral of the United States, wrote The Influence of
Sea Power upon History in 1890.
The work fit into the
popular notion that English power derived from its navy and
that Germany must have a navy to equal or surpass Britain.
It is unfortunate that most Germans did not also notice the
emphasis the work put on England's strategic position, whose
boundaries are not in contest with the other European powers.
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Flottenverein) brought together some eighty industrialists
and intellectuals.

From this point onward, the Navy League

was to grow enormously through the backing of industry (for
profit's sake) and middle class elements, becoming the
disseminator and propaganda instrument of one great national
issue:

And its role as such was not without

Navalism.

support from the Reichstag, which passed the First Navy Bill
The bill called for the building of 19

on 10 April 1898.

battleships, 8 armored cruisers, 12 large cruisers, and 30
light cruisers by 1 April 1904.

The cost was not to exceed

Though strong enough for limited sea war

408,900,000 G.M.

with France and Russia, the fleet was far from being a
threat to Britain.

The Second Navy Bill of 14 June 1900,

partly a result of the Boer War and the Boxer Rebellion in
China, called for no less than the doubling of the fleet
with no cost limit to construction.71

Not only did the Navy

Bill of 1898 and 1900 give the all clear for the fullfledged construction of a German battlefleet, but also gave
its "real" events, ones which remained a continuing issue up
to World War I.

The resulting arms race between Germany and

Britain lent itself to the support of the League which
helped to foster its very existence.
However, just as the Pan-German League, the Navy League
was not without it problems.

In many aspects, it was the

result of business and industry concerned over the

71ibid., 40-42.
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establishment of a Flottenbund by E.F. Stroschein.

The

Flottenbund resembled the Pan-Germans in composition and
followed a strict ideology concerning the naval issue.

It

was a broad-based and undisciplined movement which business
interests could not and would not tolerate within the naval
movement.72

This intervention has been interpreted as a

dampener which brought the naval movement under safe
control.

In truth, it was an extension of Sammlungspolitik.

The very nature of Stroschein's Flottenbund placed it in the
category of so many other unsuccessful organizations that
its success was uncertain.

However, with a navy led and

supported by an industrial middle calss, the possibility of
a sustained organization was far greater.

Yet the

preempting of a more agitational movement was the basis for
the Navy League's problems.

Though the concerns of

Sammlungspolitik were present in the foundation of the Navy
League, it is clear that the Navy league was not an
outgrowth of the Sammlunq.

The two were at cross purposes.

The League leadership sought to follow no course of
political agitation, while the Sammlunq naturally felt that
its partnership in the League did not require an ideological
stand on naval enthusiasm, but only an agitation which would
provoke a call for more ships.

This inner-party conflict

produced two very important results.

First, much of the

ideological leadership of the Navy League became

72Eley, Reshaping the German Right, 80.
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desensitized to the blind profiteering of the Sammlunq,
eventually accepting it as a natural part of the call to
expansion and Weltpolitik.

Secondly, and due in part to

desensitization, Tripitz' "risk theory"73 became more
acceptable to the League and drew greater support as the
means to attain the aims of Weltpolitik.

However,

Sammlungspolitik, as well as the ability of the League to
control naval enthusiasm, were soon to show their limits.

Industry and agriculture pursued opposing aims in the
areas of foreign and domestic policy, and yet as the ruling
class their's was the determing decision in political
navigation.

A unified policy was impossible for lack of

common ground.

Not until Johannes Miguel brought these two

sectors together in the political strategy known as
Sammlungspolitik did any common ground for a unified policy
exist.

Sammlunqspolitik was unique in that it disregarded

party lines entirely to focus on pure class politics.
Indeed, industry and agriculture agreed to stop their
individual efforts at monopolization of power in the state

73The 'risk theory' was a bait to content industry.
The navy to be built would serve no defensive purpose, but
was purely a weapon of offense. The assumption was that a
navy as strong or stronger than the English navy would bring
that nation to an accomodation. The theory did invoke
hostility from England, but instead of bringing the English
to the bargaining table initiated an arms race.
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and political elimination of one another; quite the
opposite, the two would form a front against the
proletariat.74

Actually, this is what Bismarck had started

with the Anti-Socialist Laws.
This was the foremost motive for the joining of industry
and agriculture in favor of single interest primacy.
Neither the policy of social insurance nor the Subversion
and Penitentiary Bills proved especially effective, creating
a sense of impatience.

But until Sammlungspolitik, the one

weapon which would work against the proletariat had not been
exploited:

the redressing of the terrible social and

political situation within Germany with a successful foreign
policy that was flashy and aggressive.

Such a foreign

policy would be credited to the existing order, thus
eliminating the proletariat threat.

Sammlungspolitik,

sought to use Bismarckian exploitation to further limits
than ever before in foreign policy.

If necessary, it would

artificially create foreign policy situations to temporarily
or apparently solve domestic problems.

In this, the press

added greatly by exaggerating foreign policy situations and
inflaming public opinion.

The overall goal, however, was

not temporary solutions, but a foreign policy free of

74Kehr, Economic Interest, Militarism and Foreign
Policy, 38.
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Bismarck's European limitations.75

Essentially, Weltpolitik

and its successor were meant to reinforce the threatened
ruling class.
The question is still open as to whether or not such a
goal was at all possible.

The point here is that Germany

adopted only a certain kind of foreign policy to solve its
internal strife.

As it happened, what little control

existed was soon lost over this policy, and the internal
forces which it sought to placate later determined foreign
policy.

This change in the course of foreign policy,

induced by internal political and social factors, was to be
the determining factor in the rejection of an Anglo-German
alliance.

The anti-British policy, since Britain stood in

the way of German power, and anti-Russian policy at the
beginning of the twentieth century were the result of
Sammlungspolitikis growth in the area of foreign policy and
its construction of the agrarian-industrial front against
the proletariat and its social democratic rhetoric.
Even though Miguel's coalition reassembled the disrupted
Bismarckian bloc, gave some definition to the ideology of
the Right and provided a semblance of structure and policy
for the government, its limitations were all too clear.
Sammlungspolitik was incapable, in the long run, of
providing two vital functions for the Right of the
75Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der
Sozialoekonomik, III (Tuebingen, 1924), 626; and Admiral
Alfred von Tirpitz, Erinnerungen (Cologne,---), 52.
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Wilhelmine era:

reintegration of the various functions on a

long-term basis, and reconstructions of a popular legitimacy
for the power bloc.76

It lacked the militant nationalism

needed to bring in the proletariat.

In short,

Sammlungspolitik did not fit the emerging political life at
the turn of the century in many ways.

In failing to gain

popular support, the policy was ultimately unable to provide
an economic rallying point nor provide an organizational
form for the Right while the separate parties kept their
individual identities.

Also, the policy did not reach any

accomodation of the forces generated by the imperialist
foreign policy, namely the radical nationalists.

And

finally, it failed to reconcile the agrarians to the idea of
an urban, industrial, capitalist society in which the
protection of landed income was not the priority of
government.

This latter point was the major failure of the

policy since this was the major long-term issue of the
period.
In these ways the decisions of 1897 created a framework
for right-wing politics which could not endure.

They sought

to use the Bismarckian policy to such an extent in a
political atmosphere that changed so rapidly that
Sammlungspolitik was soon obsolete.

The policy was forced

to adjust to stable parliamentary politics, thus emphasizing

76Geoff Eley, Sammlungspolitik ;New Haven, Conn.,
1983), 67.
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the inadequacies of the policy in the new context.

The

backwardness of Sammlungspolitik, the very fact that it was
tied to the "social dominance of a ruling group which was
economically no longer viable"77

ensured that right-wing

politics would soon outgrow its relevance.

The failure of

the ruling strata to maintain control over the political
situation ushered in the dominance of those forces which it
had sought to control.

77Kehr, Schlachtflottenbau und Parteipolitik, 278.

Chapter III
Chancellors, Intimates, and Subordinates, 1890-1900

Just as the unification of Germany under Bismarck had
ushered in a new era in European diplomacy, the fall of
Bismarck as the leading statesman of the day witnessed a
virtual revolution in diplomacy.

In many ways, it is more

proper to call the diplomacy of 1890 and afterwards a
devolution, at least as far as Germany is concerned.
Bismarck's impact had been in building a new diplomatic
system, a new balance.

Germany as it appeared in 1890 was

literally Bismarck's child.

The foundation of the Second

Reich had represented the concentration of immense power and
prosperity, but it lacked a guiding ideal.

There was no set

of higher values than the state, whose primary mission was
the protection and nurturing of its power and position.

The

diplomatic revolution of 1890 was more subtle and by far
more menacing in retrospect than Bismarck's system had ever
been.

While Bismarck had sought a status quo insuring

German continental domination and trained (or harangued) his
diplomats into following this line, his and their successors
harbored a world view, the political dimensions of which
were limited by their lack of understanding in international
politics.
If there is any one element that must be attributed as
the basic deformity of German diplomacy, foreign policy, and
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diplomats after 1890, it is a lack of range of scope and
understanding.
endeavor.

Bismarck's had been a limited scope of

He must have realized the practicality of this

all too well.

To establish a nation in the heart of Europe

was quite enough to insure dominance in European affairs, or
at least active participation if successful.

To travel

beyond this without the cooperation of Russia or France and
Britain meant the subjugation of Germany to forces it was
not yet prepared to handle.

Bismarck's understanding of the

European situation and Germany's place in it limited his
ambitions.

Conversely, those after Bismarck lacked this

crucial understanding as well as a great deal of the old
Chancellor's ability.

For them, aims and ambitions in

policy were molded to fit their appetites.

The conservative

policy of Bismarck could now be discarded since Germany was
the strongest power in Europe -- outwardly if not inwardly.
With monarchial solidarity seeming to rest more between
Germany and Austria-Hungary and Russia being cut loose to go
its own way, the old policy did not even seem practical.
What Germany was experiencing was a revolt against
Bismarckian restraints.

The role Bismarck had envisioned

for Germany no longer satisfied Germans.

It may be assumed

that a substantial part of the population in 1890, perhaps
one-third, were of the post-unification period and that most
leaders like Bismarck who held significant power before 1871
were replaced by men who came to power after 1871.

The
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older generation viewed the status quo as tenuous; the
younger generation was to view unification as a historical
necessity and the status quo as an obstacle to German power.
Whereas the older generation compared Germany to AustriaHungary and France, the younger adopted a world standard of
Britain and Russia.

This departure from old policies in

favor of a new imperialistic role was typical of the
prevailing European attitude.

However, the effect was that

of giving a complicated toy to an immature child.

The

younger generation did not even realize how close Bismarck
came to failing or how poorly his system operated.
Though only minor as an immediate effect, the new
German policy indicated an abrupt change in German attitudes
toward its own power and the European power system.

The

contradiction between Bismarck and his successors implied
the future problems of German policy.

In German eyes, the

status quo in and outside Germany was unacceptable.
Acceptance of the European status quo was necessary to
change the status quo outside Europe.

On the other hand, to

change the status quo in Europe required acceptance of that
outside Europe.

This would allow the other powers to come

into conflict and give Germany a free hand in Europe.
Germany might have succeeded if it had pursued one or the
other of these policies consistently.

Instead, Germany

sought both aims simultaneously, but achieved neither.
an ironic sense the two aims were linked.

In

Germany's switch
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to a world vision required a base of power in Europe
incompatible with that which existed.

Revolt against the

old system was an implication of the whole German state
system, and the risks inherent in the system put it in
opposition to the restraining forces of the other powers.
For a nation which had adopted a risky policy, however,
Germany showed little willingness to take risks.
In no better way can this policy be reflected than in
the men around whom the "new Germany" grew.

Many of these

men were of outstanding character or ability but many had
neither.

An in-depth study of all the key figures alone

would require several volumes.

In the short space allowed

for this study, however, only a marginal and at times
superficial treatment of the aspects of a very select group
of these men is possible.

Fittingly, their number should be

chosen from those at the hub of power.

The starting point

for this investigation is where the new met the old in a
final clash, where a military administrator suddenly found
himself the second Chancellor of Bismarck's Reich.

Leo von Caprivi was a professional soldier well noted
for administrative skill.

From 1882 to 1886 he served as

Chief of the Admiralty and his service reforms while at this
post gave the still small navy a doctrine and sense of
purpose.

He was also a realist, realizing that any

immediate successor to Bismarck was doomed to failure.

He
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did not want the burden but bore it out of a sense of duty.
But despite his sense of duty and honor and even his
considerable administrative energy, he was a man of limited
abilities in foreign and domestic affairs.

In both these

areas Caprivi was devoid of the basic knowledge and
intuition which makes a successful politician, much like the
Kaiser.

This led him to adequacy in domestic affairs and

deference to experts in foreign policy.78
The origins of Caprivi's difficulties lie in the fact
that he was not a decisive man when the stakes were as high
as those concerning a whole nation and other nations.
Caprivi is best known as a man of commercial treaties and
military organization, and yet his chancellorship marked a
turning point in a very comprehensive way.

William II,

indicating his intentions to lead the government, began his
personal regime.

He became a hindrance to Caprivi and all

who would succeed him.
significant.

Here is where Caprivi is

Caprivi felt it was time to demonstrate that

the Bismarckian constitution of the Reich could be made to
work in the hand of men other than Bismarck.79

But the

constitution set up by Bismarck was never meant as a
fundamental law.

It was often unclear and served only as a

78Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 29ff.
79Erich Eyck, Das persoenliche Regiment Wilhelms II:
Politische Geschichte des deutschen Kaiserreichs von 1 8901914 (Zurich, 1948), 15-16. See also Caprivi's letter to
Max Schneidewin, Dec. 28, 1894, in Deutsche Revue, 48
(1922), 141-2.
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set of rules as long as Bismarck could achieve his alms
through it.

Constitutional considerations were never

uppermost in his mind and he felt free to change the rules
if his policy demanded it.

The problem was that Caprivi

accepted the constitution as fundamental law and refused to
adopt a Bismarckian approach to it, resulting in a
contradiction of purposes and ability.

To Caprivi and his

successors, the constitution was fundamental and as such the
stability of the Reich, once safeguarded in the personage of
Bismarck, was now the ward of a constitution never intended
for such a purpose.

Caprivi's clashes with the Kaiser, his

approach to internal political issues, and his handling of
the nonrenewal of the Reinsurance Treaty all indicate the
lack of initiative that was to become a hallmark of his
administration."
When Caprivi took over the Chancellorship, however, he
was immediately faced with the necessity for quick action in
foreign affairs.

Bismarck had begun negotiations for the

renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty, the cornerstone of his
policy.81

Caprivi's experience had never led him to any

contact with international affairs.

Certainly not a man to

shun responsibility, he asked for information on the pending
80Egmont Zechlin,
Staatsstreichplaene Bismarcks und
Wilhelms II. 1890-1894 (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1929), 30-52.
See also Charlotte Sempell, "The Constitutional and
Political Problems of the Second Chancellor, Leo von
Caprivi," Journal of Modern History, 5 (Sept., 1953), 234-35.
8libid., Si.
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questicn from the subordinate functionaries of the foreign
office, most notably Friedrich von Holstein.

All these men

were of the opinion that the treaty with Russia was
incompatible with German obligations to Austria, Italy, and
Romania.

This view was eventually accepted even by

Schweinnitz, the ambassador to St. Petersburg.

The policy

of reinsurance toward Russia was considered a thing of the
past and the last remnants of the Bismarckian imposition
went with it.

Apart from the resulting change in Germany's

position in Europe, Caprivi started the dangerous practice
of leaving foreign policy matters to his subordinates,
relying far too heavily on their expertise and, in fact,
giving them full control of the course of foreign policy.82
Nevertheless, it would seem that the "new" direction foreign
policy agreed with Caprivi's conceptions.

His calm

acceptance of splitting Europe into two camps implies a
military rather than diplomatic approach.

He rejected all

later Russian attempts of even a simple manifestation of
political sympathy.83

His handling of these matters proved

that the constitution required a Chancellor familiar with
and capable in diplomacy.

82Wilhelm von Schweinitz, ed., Denkwuerdigkeiten des
Botschafters General von Schweinitz (Berlin, 1927), II, 4048.
83Grosse Politik, VII,
22-23. A comparison of the
memorandums of Holstein, Marschall, Kiderlen, and Raschdau,
all of May 20, 1890, shows that it was Caprivi's decision to
make the refusal absolute while the foreign Office inclined
toward a dilatory or even open option policy.

I
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Despite promises of continuing where Bismarck had left
off, Caprivi's tenure as Chancellor and the first half of
his successor Hohenlohe were a transitional period.

Caprivi

carried on the Bismarckian tradition of continental
concentration, but Hohenlohe abandoned it.

Caprivi, in his

commercial treaties and work toward solving internal rifts,
emerges as a possible alternative to Weltpolitik.

Yet his

position was far too weak for him to set up his policy as
the long-term policy of the Reich.

He believed Germany had

no chance of ever becoming a world power, and so he worked
at home on strengthening the army, limiting the navy's role,
and seeking nominal relations with England.

Setting his

efforts against the problems Germany faced, he found his
greatest enemy within Germany itself.

His conservation of

an old system was neither understood nor appreciated.
Germans had come to perceive their destiny as lying beyond
the limits of Europe.

The system, even with the reforms of

Caprivi, was no longer suited to the desires of the people.
Once the Chancellor was overthrown, his policy was discarded
and replaced.

Captain von Mueller, wrote in a memorandum to

Admiral Prince Heinrich, the Kaiser's brother:
Caprivi's policy, now so widely ridiculed, would have
been brilliantly vindicated by history if the German
people were not coming to accept an entirely different
opinion of their ability and duty to expand than that
expressed in our naval and colonial development so
far....Now, the Caprivi policy had been officially
abandoned, and the new reich government will hesitantly
put to the nation the question - in the form of the new
Navy Bill - whether the other policy, Weltpolitik, really
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can be adopted.84
Whether or not his policy was viable comes under question
if examination is made of his calm acceptance of the lapse
with Russia.

His foreign policy aims, while never as

complicated as Bismarck's, were never as clear-cut either.
He apparently saw advantage to losing the Russian alliance
in that this would simplify the demands of foreign policy
upon him.

And if it is considered that his handling of

foreign affairs most usually required deference to
subordinates with skill in diplomacy, then it certainly
cannot be held that his failure was due totally to a new
desire of expansion among the German people.

Instead, it

must be assumed that Caprivi was a man who lacked diplomatic
knowledge.

He tried to compensate with a simplification of

terms, but was obviously led by the policies of William and
the advice of Holstein and others; he felt he was doomed to
failure, a circumstance certainly difficult to cope with for
a professional soldier.

And in the chaos of the

international affairs of the 1890s, administrative skill was
not enough to make up for his lack of understanding and the
actions he was forced take contradictory to his ideas.

It

84Der Kaiser. Autzeichnungen des Chefs des
Marinekabinetts Admiral Georg Alexander von Muller ueber die
Aera Wilhelem II, ed. by W Goerlitz (Berlin, Frankfurt,
Zuerich, 1965), 36-41. The passage quoted is on page 40, an
English version of which may be found in J.C.G. Roehl, From
Bismarck to Hitler: the Problem of Continuity in German
History (London, 1970), 56-60 along with supporting
argumentation.
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would seem more than anything else that Caprivi was his own
worst enemy, not by choice but by the simple fact that he
was not a politician nor a diplomat.

He was the wrong man

in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Because Caprivi did not stage

COUD

d'etat's from above

nor even follow a policy of repression against the
Socialists, the anti-Caprivi conservatives forced his
resignation.
power.

This is not to say that he was forced out of

Quite likely, with the support of Marschall von

Bieberstein and Holstein, two always faithful to him, he
could have remained in power.
disenchanted.

But Caprivi was tired and

Former companions in the field were now his

political enemies.

The job of controlling his Prussian

Ministers of State, the Foreign Office, and various others
his duties required placed increasing strain on him.

Every

task set before him became increasingly difficult,
especially with Philipp von Eulenberg (the Kaiser's personal
friend and advisor) undercutting his every move.

All this

and William II's frightening inconsistency caused Caprivi to
submit his resignation in October, 1894.

After some

deliberation, William let him go.85
Purportedly, when William asked of Eulenberg whom he
could now appoint, Eulenberg retorted, "A man who is neither

85Roehl, Germany_Without Bismarck, 241-70.
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conservative nor liberal, neither ultra-montane nor radical,
neither clerical nor atheist, is hard to find.""

If this

was actually what was said, then it was not far from the
truth.

Political talent was a rare thing to find,

especially considering William's preference of men not so
strongly opinionated as himself.

His final choice, Prince

Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfuerst, fit his expectations
as to what a Chancellor should be in most circumstances,
with the new Chancellor only occasionally blocking William's
way.
Hohenlohe's career in politics was a respected one.

He

had been instrumental in evading opposition to Empire in
southern Germany, serving after 1871 as the Ambassador to
Paris and governor of Alsace-Lorraine.

Despite his

experience, though, he was not considered to be capable of
anything greater than what he had thus achieved.

He was

vague, indecisive, and generally very unsure of himself.
Add to this the fact that he was much older when he took
over the Chancellorship than Bismarck had been when he
established the Chancellor's duties and the picture is that
of a respectable man easily controlled by the Kaiser.
Hohenlohe's stubbornness did stop some of the Kaiser's more
dangerous ideas, but it could not take the place of positive

"Johannes Haller, Aus dem heben des Fuersten Philipp
zu Eulenberg- Hertefeld (Berlin, 1924), p. 154. This
comment comes originally from Eulengerg's diary entry of
Oct. 24, 1894.
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leadership.

The inter-palace and inter-agency fighting

characteristic of the Caprivi administration became so
intense under Hohenlohe as to block any initiative on
policy.87
Much more than his predecessor, Hohenlohe concentrated on
the domestic problems at the time, defining foreign affairs
to von Marschall and Holstein.

The actions he took during

his chancellorship did show he knew the value of good
relations with the Kaiser, but consequently nothing of the
implications involved in allowing Williams free hand.

Most

usually Hohenlohe would request time to reconsider a matter
if he and William disagreed.

He considered this far

preferable to Caprivi's confrontations with William.

The

time requested for reconsideration, he reasoned, would allow
the Kaiser's temper and anger to abate and allow for calmer,
more fruitful discussion.88

It is no surprise that this is

the tact Hohenlohe used as a diplomat, and it must be
remembered he was a Bismarckian diplomat, taking orders and
being led by the master.

As Chancellor, it was his job to

give orders and lead while restraining the Kaiser's
ambitions.

This was a task for which his training,

experience, and personality were ill-suited.

He was, in

87Nicholas, Germany after Bismarck, 37-44.
For a more
complete estimation of Hohenlahe by his colleagues, see
Theodore Heo, b. Friedrich Narmann, der Mann, das Werk, die
Zeit (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1937), 199 f.
88Hugo von Reischach, Under Three Emperors (London,
1927), 170-171.
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short, a timid old man.
The only true success of Hohenlohe's method was in its
very first use.

It was William's desire during 1884 and

1885 to enact legislation against the Social Democratic
Party, essentially a revival of Bismarck's antisocialist
laws (Ausnahmegesitze).

These laws had lapsed after

Bismarck's fall, and the Kaiser threatened the Reichstag to
pass such legislation which would result in elimination of
universal manhood suffrage and thus the creation of a more
cooperative parliament.

Hohenlohe, an aristocrat, had no

objection to such laws, but being a moderate liberal he
insisted that such legislation be passed legally.
Furthermore, he pointed out to William that repressive
measures only increased the public's fear of political
reaction.

When William flew into a rage, Hohenlohe

postponed the issue.

When the Prussian ministers agreed

with Hohenlohe's stand on the antisocialist laws William,
not wanting to dismiss Hohenlohe only one year after
Caprivi, had no other recourse but to allow the Chancellor
to have his way.89
Similarly, the Jameson Raid into the Transvaal in late
1895 proved that Hohenlohe's method was successful.

Unable

to prevent the sending of the famed Kruger Telegram,

89The Kaiser to Caprivi, Sept. 9, 1894, in Zechlin,
Stoatsstreichplaene, 191-92; for the Kaiser's political mood
in 1894-95, see ibid., 186-88; an Nichols, Germany after
Bismarck, 33334, 39, 341-42.
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Hohenlohe soon found he could not contain his master's
desire for naval expansion by simple postponement.

Instead,

he requested postponement and consolation with the leaders
of the larger parties to determine if passage was possible.
All three party leaders consulted agreed that the tax burden
of the navy's regular budget might even have trouble passing
the Reichstag; any prospect of a special loan was hopeless.
Hohenlohe then warned the Kaiser that the introduction and
defeat of such a bill would be a humiliation for the Kaiser
himself in the eyes of the other European nations.

William,

once again blocked, acquiesced to the chancellor's opinion.
Thusfar, Hohenlohe had been able to accomplish his prime
objective of preventing a conflict with the Reichstag over
naval expansion.

His aim in promoting fleet expansion was

also to keep the friendship of Britain, though the Naval
Bill he laid before the Reichstag on 6 December 1897 was
from the start aimed at Britain.

In his speech on the bill

he disclaimed any inteLtion of challenging Britain, saying:
This measure shows you that we are not thinking of
competing with the great sea powers, and for those
with eyes to see it demonstrates that a policy of
adventure is far from our minds. Precisely because we
want to carry out a peaceful policy, we must make an
effort to build our fleet into a power factor which
carries the necessary weight in the eyes of friend and
foe alike.... In maritime questions, Germany must be
able to speak a modest but, above all, a wholly German
word."

These words were to quiet parliamentary fears over naval

"Quoted in Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent, 164.
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expansion.

Consequently he felt that his method was the

proper one, ignoring repeated warnings from Holstein that he
should exclude William from direct involvement in policymaking.91

But the Chancellor's procrastination made

William, who interpreted postponement as a lack of
sincerity, suspicious, thus ruining the relationship between
chancellor and Kaiser that Hohenlohe wished to preserve.92
Had Hohenlohe not sought to secure William's consent of his
own plans by this same method, he might have preserved the
cordial relationship with the Kaiser.

In an attempt to gain

passage of a military court reform bill, the Chancellor
found his role reversed.
method against him.

William turned Hohenlohe's own

Caught between the threat of dismissal

or resignation and the possible constitutional crisis that
might follow any further confrontation, Hohenlohe resigned
himself to a compromise for which he had no liking.

After

two years of debate in the Reichstag, the Military Court
Bills passed and the relationship between Chancellor and
Kaiser became one of hostility and suspicion.

Impatient

with Hohenlohe's cautious maneuvers, William replaced him
with Bernhard von Buelow, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in

91Haller, Eulenberq, 183-85; Norman Rich, Friedrich von
Holstein: Poltics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and
William II (New York, 1965), II, 484, 505-8, 842.
92J. David Farley, "Government by Procrastination:
Chancellor Hohenlahe and Kaiser William II, 1894-1900,"
Central European History, 7 (June, 1974), 168-70. (entire
article runs 159-183)
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October 1900.93
Little will be said of Buelow due to the limited scope of
this study.

It is clear that he was very nationalistic, but

he was also a trained diplomat.

He had held quite fervently

until 1887 that the primary focus of foreign relations must
be Russia.

Whether due to his own nationalism, the

influence of associates or the Kaiser, or some other
influence, Buelow suddenly switched his diplomatic focal
point to England.

Most likely, however, it would seem very

likely that Buelow's nationalism was a world view in
actuality.

His work on the expansion of the battlefleet is

evidence that as long as he was responsible for the course
of German fcreign policy his design was for world power.94
Whatever the case, the Kaiser now had a Chancellor who
accepted and espoused the case for German Weltpolitik and
whose actions were as devastating to Germany's world
position as those of the Kaiser himself.

The chancellors Caprivi and Hohenlohe had little if any
influence overall.

Most of their efforts were either

stymied during their terms in office or were abandoned once
they were gone.

Most of the blame for this lies in the fact

93ibid., 177-182.
94Peter Winzan, "Prince Buelow's Eeltmach politik,"
Australian Journal of Politics and History, 22 (August
1976), 232-236. (Article goes from 227-242 total).
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that they were merely chosen as instruments of the Kaiser's
will.

They, however, chose to remain closer to the ideals

of the constitution and were not willing to forsake it for
consistent policy.

This led to suspicion and hostility for

the most part with no reasonable chance of any viable policy
emerging.

Added to this were the subordinates of the

Foreign Office to whom matters of foreign policy and
diplomacy were left, in particular Friedrich Holstein.
Another detriment to the authority of the chancellors were
those intimate with Kaiser.
was Philipp zu Eulenburg.

The most notable of this group
Between the subordinates and the

intimates, the power of the chancellorship decreased and the
will of the Kaiser was influenced and his views on foreign
policy advocated.
Philipp Eulenburg was the most powerful member of the
entourage known as the "Liebenberg Circle."

His

relationship with the Kaiser was unique and differed from
all others because of its closeness and strangeness.
Consequently, not even William's official advisors had such
opportunity to influence him.

William had first met

Eulenburg in 1886 while hunting at the East Prussian estate
of Proekelwitz.

The two immediately found in each other a

complementing personality.

So taken was William with

Eulenburg that he induced him to stay on for an extra week
of hunting.

By the time William acceded to the throne,

their friendship was firmly established.

At first Eulenburg
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feared that the social gap between them would necessarily
have to widen with William's position.

This fear was short-

lived, however, as William found the friendship of Eulenburg
an antidote for the pressure and loneliness of the throne.
William spent much of his free and "working" time with
Eulenberg.

Eulenberg, in return, hosted the young Kaiser at

many parties, introducing him to some of the wealthiest and
most influential men from across Germany and Europe.

The

social gap which had been bridged by friendship was now
spanned also by politics as William engineered his friend's
diplomatic prominence.

Such intimacy allowed Eulenburg to

arrange appointments and thus influence policy over time.
His new position of power allowed him to place friends in
positions of importance and influence policy even more.

Not

until 1907 were his enemies able to destroy him with charges
of homosexuality.95
In examining Eulenburg's personality, it must be realized
that this was the basis for his relationships and political
importance.

Such an examination also brings into light the

fact that his homosexuality was very relevant to his career.
This must not be misinterpreted.

Although it was an aspect

which endeared him to William and made him charming and
affable to others, it is also what made him completely

95Isabell V. Hull, The Entourage of Kaiser Wilhelm
1888-1918 (New York, 1982), 45-47.
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devoted to William in every way.96

Yet his background was

not unlike those of his contemporaries.

Born to an old

noble Prussian family, he received a gymnasium education.
He served some time in the military, even a stint in the
Franco-Prussian War, but soon switched to a career in the
civil service.

Though earning a doctorate in law, he found

the friends acquired while preparing for it more useful than
the degree itself.

Soon tired of the routine of the civil

service, he again changed careers, this time to the
diplomatic corps, where he stayed until his retirement in
1902.

However, no matter nis position, his income never

quite matched his tastes.

When William made Eulenburg a

Prince in 1900, the court nobility were disturbed by this
disparity.

No matter how admirable his qualities, they felt

that wealth was a requisite for nobility.

Without it one

could not maintain the necessary lifestyle.97
Until the time he met William, Eulenburg's diplomatic
career was relatively undistinguished.

Bismarck thought of

him as capable of more damage than he was worth.

When he

first met William he was first secretary to the Prussian
legation in Munich.

Both Holstein and the Bismarcks felt he

96William to Eulenberg, Nov. 8, 1886 in J.C.G. Roehl,
Philipp Eulenbergs Politische Korrespondenz, I (Boppordam
Rhein, 1976-), no, 188.
97Eulenburg also worried that his financial position
was not appropriate to such a title. See Eulenberg to
William, May 12, 1899 in Roehl, Eulenbergs Korrespondenz,
vol. 3.
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could be a good influence on the young William and gave him
access to and advice on information from the Foreign
Office.98

By 1888, with his friendship with William firmly

secured, Eulenburg began his meteoric rise as a diplomat.
At first he acted only as a liaison between the Foreign
Office and William, and he carried out policy according to
the dictates of Holstein.

As the conflict with Bismarck

grew in 1889-90, however, Eulenburg gradually moved toward
an acceptance and even advocation of William's ideas.

In a

more disturbing sense, he was apt to follow his own personal
policies.

In effect, he was developing his own personal

regime and was gradually becoming less and less dependent on
others for his political thouc't.
dismissal, Eulenburg was at t

By the time of Bismarck's

center of high politics.99

Ultimately, the policy which Eulenburg followed toward
William was neither one of advocacy or opposition, but quite
simply prevention to preserve William's personal popularity.
William was reckless, fiery, and often exaggerated the need
for forceful action.

While his influence is nonetheless

apparent, it would seem that Eulenburg's main object was to
make the Kaiser's plans more plausible.1
" If it is to be
said that Eulenburg was a detrimental force to the whole of

98ibid., I, no. 5, 315.
99Hull, The Entourage of Kaiser Wilhelm 11, 80-83.
100Hortmut Pogge von Strandmann and Immannuel Geiss,
Die Erforderlickfeit des Unmoeqlichen (Frank Hurt, 1965), 8
ff.
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German policy, then in making the Kaiser's schemes
plausible he truly was such a force.

It would seem that any

advisor influential enough to further a leader's plans would
be of benefit to the whole of policy.
however, this was just the opposite.

In Wilhemine Germany,
William's ideas, even

when made plausible, were nonetheless dangerous.

The idea

of Eulenburg as a political intriguer working for the
advocation of his own policy cannot hold true since his
policy was always identical to William's.
William required this.

His love for

That Eulenburg was much more a

conservative, and thus more moderate, than William indicates
that, all good intentions for the Kaiser put aside, his was
as detrimental a role to German policy as William's because
he preserved William's course.

German foreign policy would

have stagnated or, better, found a new course had not
William's plans been made acceptable to Holstein and the
Foreign Office.
the Kaiser.

Even Eulenbura was aware of his effect upon

He realized his aim as that of re-establishing

William's power to run the government himself, using the
subordinates and bureaucracy not as agencies of policy in
themselves, but as tools of the Kaiser's policy:
It is difficult to admit, but the establishment
of the German Empire, that is, the blending of
Liberal and German with Prussian blood, the
combination of a ruling statesman [Bismarck] and
a sleeping Kaiser-hero fWilhelm I] have ruined
A king who rules by
the old Prussian Kingdom.
himself, despite the fact that this is his right, is
unthinkable in the eyes of the 'educated,
When William appears as an
progressive' people....
The
actual ruler, that is only his perfect right.
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only question is whether the consequences can be
endured in the long run.101
Eliminating all other possible routes as far too risky to
reestablish the power of the Kaiser and the predominance of
traditional Prussian politics, Eulenburg settled the policy
he deemed comparatively risk free.

This policy was one of

William allying himself with the conservatives, in
particular the secondary circle of men close to the Kaiser,
the industrialists.

The two men most associated with William from the
business sphere, Fritz Krupp and Albert Ballin, were like
Eulenberg negative forces, but of a different kind.
Eulenburg's impact was his devotion to the preservation of
William's personal image to a great degree but tempered with
some insight at least into the problems of radical action.
His was not, however, a mind which ever realized the danger
of making the Kaiser's plans plausible.

Krupp and Ballin,

on the other hand, showed very little insight or interest in
the problems of German power.

For many years historians

assumed that William's interest in Krupp's steel and
armament company and Ballin's Hamburg-American line was due
to actual financial investment in the firms.

Indeed William

was interested in the fortunes of the companies, Balm's

10/Johannes Huller, ed., Aus dem Leben des Fuersten
Philipps zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld (Berlin/Leipzig, 1926), 17882.
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more so than Krupp's, but it is evident that his attraction
to the two men was more for fulfillment of his goals and
personal friendship than monetary gains.102

Both were

captains, or Kaisers, in respective industries.

Both

professed a dislike of those things not quite German.

But

more important, each reflected a side of the Kaiser and, in
essence, became a completion of the Kaiser's views.
It would not be redundant to state that William II was a
two-sided man.

At times he was frail, nervous, and weak; at

others, he roared like a lion, seemingly ready to conquer
the world.

His attraction to these two men and the

influence they had upon him reflect his need not only for
like minds, hut like personalities gathered around him.

A

dual personality such as himself might have led to
quarreling, but individual personalities appealing to either
of his separate sides suited his need for fulfillment.
Bailin was strong and aggressive; Krupp was a weaker
personality and had a nervous condition which often left him
incapacitated.

Also, these individuals were becoming part

of the whole movement of German nationalism, reckless though
it was, and support of the Kaiser's plans (if only through
pursuit of financial gain) greatly influenced the Kaiser in
naval and armament decisions.
Like everyone who served him for long, however, Ballin

102Bernhard, Huldermann, Albert Bailin (London, 1922),
106.
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and Krupp were as much subordinates of William as he was of
their advice.

Both were not only awed by him, but also

sorry for him.

Ballin's own words describe a circle of men

witnessing a man who would go from "childlike, happy
optimism" to "almost helpless depression" at any sigh of
criticism.

Later in his life, Ballin could not even bring

" In the end,
himself to tell the kaiser the war was lost.1
Ballin and Krupp's influence was negligible and almost as
destructive as such because they normally bowed to William's
wishes.
On the other end of those influencing the policy was
Friedrich von Holstein.
of Eulenburg's.

His role was entirely opposite that

The snapping of the Russian tie and the

shattering of the Bismarckian system in 1890 had left him
the strongest force in the new policy.
not to wane until 1897.

His influence was

Raschdau commented on this man,

"
noting his good-natured contempt for his superiors.1
Schwenitz noted to Caprivi, Holstein's apparent intention to
go over the heads of these superiors to accomplish foreign
policy goals, describing him as a "personality who is not
quite right in the head" and who was using his position and
the service to serve his own goals of foreign policy.

After

101
- Lamer Cecil, Albert Bailin. Business and Politics in
Imperial Germany 1888-1918 (Princeton, New Jersey, 1967),
212, 338.
104Ludwig Raschdau, Unter Bismarck und Caprivi
Errinerunaen einer deutschen Diplomaten auf den Jahren 18851894 (Berlin, 1939), 142.
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complaining without success to Caprivi, Schwenitz resigned
his post in St. Petersburg. 105
inside the Foreign Ministry.

Such was Holstein's enigma

His authority and judgement

became the overriding decision on the choices of ambassadors
and any ambassador whose career had developed under Bismarck
was encouraged to resign.
Holstein's difference from Eulenburg lay in the fact that
Schwenitz was correct in observing Holstein as a disturbing
personality.

Born in 1837, his father recommended the

diplomatic service for his son after having other fiel_s
closed to him, rejecting his legal career, and refusing to
buy land and become a member of the landed gentry.

From the

moment he applied for transfer to the
Reichsauswaertigesdienst, his career was linked to Bismarck.
After some difficulty with the Prussian Foreign Minister
Schleinitz, he was given an attache' post in St. Petersburg.
During the next years, his association with the Bismarck's
grew to one of intimacy.

In 1862, Holstein returned to

Germany to prepare for admission exams into the regular
diplomatic service, which he readily passed, earning the
Secretary of Legation post in Rio de Janiero.

Recalled in

December 1863 to Denmark, he was then attached to the
Prussian London Embassy in April 1864, staying there until
mid summer 1865.

Journeying to North America, he completely

105H.L. von Schweinitz, Denkwuerdigkeiten, ed. W. von
Schweintz, ii (Berlin, 1927), 443.

missed the Austro-Prussian War and reportedly became
involved with the wife of senator Charles Sumner.

This

episode so insulted and wounded Holstein emotionally that in
later years he became a recluse in his social life.

The

other dramatic event in Holstein's life came in 1873.
Serving Ambassador Harry Arnim in Paris, Holstein was
accused of being Bismark's stool pidgeon against Arnim when
the Chancellor and Ambassador came into conflict.

No

evidence supports this conclusion, but the event drove
Holstein even further into reclusion in his social life and
work.
On closer examination, certain semblances between
Holstein and the Kaiser are brought out.

Holstein

eliminated opposition by controlling who got what position
and where, often giving posts to those of little if any
talent.

This action resulted in something quite similar to

the entourage which the Kaiser grouped around him.

Every

aspect of that entourage was fulfilling some psychological
need of William's.

So too were those in the Foreign Service

and Ministry with whom Holstein encircled himself, but in a
far more important sense.
fulfillment.

These men served as political

In the most general terms, Holstein's

'entourage' was centered around him to serve his need for
political importance, much in the same way as William's
'entourage' complimented his dual personality.
While Holstein enjoyed power, he always avoided its
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outward trappings, partly to retain the power he had.

In

doing so he became a man of mystery and a scapegoat for
others when their policies led Germany to disaster.
a grey blur in the Wilhelmstrasse.

He was

Prince Bernhard von

Buelow was foremost of his critics, describing him as
innately evil, a "corsaire,.... created for devilments."106
Yet others testify that Holstein was a good-hearted man,
contrary to the general impression.

His greatest fault was

excessive suspicion leading to vindictive hate.
Holstein and William compare favorably here.
criticism as a personal attack.

Again,

Both took

It is therefore hard to

imagine Ambassador to Italy Anton von Monts' appraisal of
Holstein as a man who selflessly surrendered himself to the
service.

The assessment that he was the hardest worker in

the foreign office is true, but it is not always clear to
what purpose the effort went.107
Holstein's influence has been exaggerated, but is was
quite out of proportion to the office he held.

The twenty-

six years of his political career were spent as a
vortraegenderrat, roughly equivalent to an assistant under
secretary.

Knowing that a higher position would lay a

burden of more responsibility on him which in turn would
106prince Bernhard von Buelow, Memoirs of Prince
Bernhard von Buelow, 4 (Boston, 1931-32), 394-95.
107C. William Vogel, "The Holstein Enigma:
A
Reappraisal of its Origins," Journal of Modern History,
XIV, 1 (March, 1942), 49-51.

89
diminish his authority, he refused all offers of promotion.
The great misfortune about Holstein was how he was put to
use.

His task for Bismarck had been in the collection of
This data, reported in superb Bismarckian-style

data.

dispatches, was excellent and of great value to Bismarck in
forming judgements.

The leaders of Wilhelmine Germany,

however, not only depended on him for data but judgement
also.

In truth, Holstein was the only one to turn to, and

here was the unnoticed danger.1
"
Holstein is perhaps the perfect example of the risks
taken by a nation when relying on a career diplomat.
Germany was unfortunate in choosing an imperfect specimen in
which to place its trust.

Bismarck exemplifies what can be

done by a well-rounded personality in a special situation;
Holstein exemplifies the reverse.

While as good a technical

diplomat as Bismarck, Holstein lacked personality and
judgement; while his political ideas were sound, he was
unable to keep up with the times.

When mixed with

overcalculation, excessive suspicion, and personal
vindictiveness, his inabilities in the role of de facto
direction of foreign policy did appreciable damage to
Germany. 109
108ibid., 47-48.
109E. Malcolm Carrol, Germay and the Great Powers,
1866-1914:
A Study in public opinion and Foreign Policy
(New York, 1938), 287.
For a clearer discourse, see William
L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902 (New
York, 1935), 793.
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For all his faults, Holstein had correctly appraised the
relationships between the Kaiser and Eulenburg.

He reached

the logical conclusion that the only way to stop William and
save the monarchy was to allow him to follow through with
one of his wild schemes.

He was convinced the the resulting

fiasco and the threat of a mass resignation by the ministers
would lead to responsible government.

It was a risky last

resort, and one Holstein could not bring himself to
attempt.110

These three examples of influence within Wilhelmine
policy are all negative and very much different from each
other.

But they do illustrate several fundamental ideas.

First, to make a policy stick, one had to be close to
William.

Since he was not known to base his decisions on

careful thought, proximity was a definite tool of influence.
Second, one had to be familiar with William's personality
and know how to handle his moods to advantage.

Third, to

have consistent influence on policy one also had to have a
consistent Weltanschauung on several levels:

personal,

domestic and foreign policy, and even rank and title.
Narrowing one's focus to a single arena damaged or destroyed

11°The Tarisch spy scandal was much of the reason for
Halstein's reluctance to act. Without the support of
Marschall, who was involved in the prosecution of the syp
trial, or the support of Eulenburg to any degree at all,
Halstein may have felt the move too risky for Germany and
his own career. See Rich, Halstein, II, for more detail on
the affair and its consequences.
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victories in others.

Finally, one's politics were more

assured of acceptance if William agreed with them or
believed he should agree with them for the sake of tradition
and the nation.

Once Eulenburg was gone, only the military

entourage was able to fulfill these requirements, especially
Tirpitz.
The most fundamental problem concerning those influencing
William and policy was a lack of coherent policy not at the
top but rather at lower levels.

Neither Eulenburg, the

industrialists, or Holstein were able or sufficiently
attempted to come together in agreement on basic issues of
policy.

If they had done so, there would have existed a

much higher degree of consistency in policy and,
consequently, a much higher degree of stability in European
politics.

Much of the problem lay in the fact that these

three groupings of power, though supposedly seeking glory
for Germany, were instead pursuing three different courses.
Unofficially Eulenburg and the industrialists sought gains
for themselves and either gave in to the Kaiser or moderated
his extravagant ideas so as to make them acceptable.

This

patching up of difficulties and lack of will to face the
Kaiser created a ruler who believed himself capable of rule.
When Eulenburg faded into the background in 1906 -- as did
Holstein after the First Moroccan Crisis -- the military
entourage which took his place never criticized and was for
the most part wholly in agreement with William, and thus

92
William and Germany's delusion of responsible rule
continued.
On the other hand, the only true official power was not
the Chancellor or even the Kaiser, but Holstein.

His

importance died out after 1897, but in the seven years he
dominated the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service he made
it an independent agency of policy acting in accordance with
his own view of policy and the ability of the Kaiser to make
policy decisions.

Much of his independence of action came

from the fact that he was the only one after Bismarck who
exhibited any knowledge of the diplomatic scene, but also
because unlike the Chancellor, he was out of contact with
the Kaiser.

The final analysis is simple:

there existed

too many political variables and policy variations, all
working in opposite directions combined with a lack of
communication, for a coherent policy dominated by one figure
or through a logical system to emerge.

Had such direction

emerged from the pinnacle of power or from a mere
subordinate, it would have been much preferable to the chaos
which existed.

Chapter IV
The Chaos of Wilhelmine Diplomacy

The reorientation of Russian policy after the
cancellation of the Reinsurance Treaty was only natural.

No

fault can be found in the considerations of the statesmen in
St. Petersburg and abroad.

Their position '.,as this:

faced

with German dominance on the continent, the most likely
solution seemed alliance with France if the cost was not
excessive.

However, Russian policy had also antagonized

England and this was an even greater problem than Germany.
With German unification in 1871, Russian continental
concerns had switched to the Near East, the obvious aim
being control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles.

Being an

age-old policy, it had been followed unswervingly as an
indispensible part of Russian policy.

Through a policy of

indirect action to avoid resistance from other European
powers, Russia hoped to gain control of the Balkans and open
the road to Constantinople.

In the interests of its aims,

Russia had paid special attention to the anti-Austrian
Serbians and Bulgarians since 1877.

However, since its

exclusion from Italian and German affairs, Austria's
interest in the Balkans had blocked Russian aims, but
Germany took no part in these activities.

Bismarck stated

that Germany did not oppose Russian acquisition of the
Straits.

The only resentment that the Russians could have
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felt was that their own blundering had resulted in the
Austro-German Alliance of 1879, even though this was a
purely defensive pact and was in no way a show of German
support for Austrian ambitions in the Balkans.111
Resisting Austrian appeals for help, Bismarck attempted
mediation through the Three Emperor's League and direct:
compromise.

He suggested agreements such as the eastern

Balkans for Russia and the western Balkans for Austria.

For

Russia, this was only a means to an end, and during the
Congress of Berlin Russia even prepared a proposal for
abandonment of the Western Balkans to Austria.

In 1886-87,

Russia also inclined toward similar petition proposals by
Bismarck.112

English satisfaction with the Treaty of Berlin

was matched only by Russian disillusionment.

The sentiment

on a whole was that Russia had been deprived of any reward
by England and Austria.

Russia placed much of the blame on

Bismarck for doing nothing.113

But it must be remembered

that Bismarck was acting only as mediator, and even in this
position was inclined to seek agreements guaranteeing the
highest degree of stability to European politics and thus
securing Germany's hold on the continent.

This was his

recognized policy, and trickery or favoritism toward Russia

- Langer, Franco-Russian Alliance, 82-85.
112J.V. Fuller, Bismarck's Diplomagy at its Zenith
(Cambridge, 1922), 233-240.
113William L. Langer, European Alliance and Alignments,
1871-1890 (New York, 1931), 172-173.

95
was not a conscious act.

Hostility toward Bismarck also

sprang from the Austro-German Alliance, particularly after
the Austrians rejected all petition proposals.
this for two reasons:

They did

first, Austria wished to eliminate

Russian influence in the Balkans altogether to keep Turkey
and the Slavic states weak; secondly, a Russian foothold of
any kind in the region would possibly draw the Slavic states
away from Austria and disrupt the Empire.
policy was England.

The pivot of this

Without German support, England was the

only European power who could stand in the way, and more
importantly, was willing to stand in the way of Russian
dominance in the Balkans.114
English policy during the previous century had been to
block Russian ambitions toward the Straits.

Some in England

believed this policy archaic, but to most it was the main
objective of policy.

Disraeli was prepared to go to war

over the issue in 1878.

But the English remembered the

great difficulty in stopping the Russians in 1854, realizing
that only by checking them on both land and the sea was the
policy viable.

To this end, the English consistently

supported Austrian policies in the Balkans.

Any Austrian

consent to a settlement in the Balkans would have resulted
in the loss of English support for its policy, thus leaving
Austria at the mercy of Russia and without German support.
After 1876 and particularly after 1886 Russian
114 C P

IX

no. 2077 and no. 2084.
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ambitions in the Balkans came to naught due to the
cooperation of Austria and England

The complete expression

of this cooperation can be seen in the 1887 Mediterranean
Agreements.

Due to the Mediterranean, Russia and England

were irreconcilable enemies.

In diplomatic terms, the best

solution was England's isolation.115

The proposals of

compromise to Austria had been attempts as this.

The

Reinsurance Treaty of 1887 had the isolation of France as
its object.

From the Russian side it excluded Germany from

support of Austria in the Balkans and even more important of
adopting the English stance in the Straits, giving Russia
insurance against German attack if she and England came into
armed conflict.
Once the Bulgarian Crisis of 1886 finally convinced the
Russians that further proposals to and agreements with
Austria or England were futile, St. Petersburg politely
informed Austria that Russia would not cooperate in future
negotiations.

On this matter the foreign minister Nicholas

de Giers, Ambassador to Berlin Count Paul Shuvalov, and the
Tsar were agreed but also agreed that agreements with
Germany were desirable.

The Tsar authorized negotiations

and Giers and Shuvalov drew up a set of objects which
Shuvalov took with him to Berlin in May 1887.

First, Russia

sought to maintain peace with guarantees from the strongest
and most influential state of Europe (Germany) to protect
115ibid., no. 2079; IV, no.
918.
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herself from hostile European coalitions (Austria and
England); second, to prevent arbitrary readjustment of the
Balkan status quo and have recognized the preponderance of
Russia in the two Bulgarias; third, to secure inviolability
of the Straits through German support and the restraint, by
force if necessary, of the other powers.116
Armed with this set of objectives, Shuvalov departed for
Berlin, arriving there on 10 May.

Conferences between

Bismarck and Shuvalov ran from 11 to 18 May.

The second

article of the Russian draft of the treaty corresponded with
the second object listed above and presented no problem.
But various drafts were required before an agreement could
be reached on the troublesome first and second articles.
Finally, Bismarck prepared to make Article I strictly
defensive, which did not suit Shuvalov at all.

This meant

that each side would remain neutral only if the other were
attacked by a third power.

Shuvalov argued that Russia had

many enemies while Germany only had one (France) and could
not remain impassive in the face of every threat.

Bismarck

countered that Russia was only offering "half-neutrality" in
a Franco-German war in return for the same in an AustroRussian war, with full neutrality only in a conflict between
Russia and England, Turkey or Italy.

Unable to answer the

argument, Shuvalov proceeded to work out a clause to Article
I which read:

"This provision would not apply to a war

116 Langer, European Alliances and Alignments
, 417-418.
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against Austria or France if this war should result from an
attack directed against one of these two latter powers by
one of the High Contracting Parties."117

Giers and the Tsar

were satisfied with the treaty, but Shuvalov still pressed
Bismarck for aid in Bulgaria.

Showing a lack of patience

quite uncharacteristic to his diplomacy, Bismarck warned the
Russians not to overestimate German friendship,
threateningly concluding that if the old relationship with
Russia came to an end, Germany could seek agreements
elsewhere.

Dissatisfied but tired of negotiations, Shuvalov

agreed and the treaty was ratified in mid-June.
English attitudes toward France and the like policies of
both nations towards the Near East explain much of England's
reluctance to enter into any agreement with Germany.

French

and English troops had fought side by side to stop Russian
ambitions.

After 1870, though playing a less significant

role, France still supported England against Russian
ambitions.

Consequently, much to Bismarck's dismay,the

English never seriously considered any of Bismarck's
proposals aimed at France.118

Quite simply stated, Russia

saw gain in a continued Franco-German antagonism.

Had

117G.P., V, nos. 1082 ff.
For a text of the treaty,
see Alfred Franzis Pribram, ed., Die politischen
-eheimvertraege Oesterreich - Ungarns, 1879-1984 (Vienna,
Leipzig, 1920). This volume is essential for its text of
treaties and negotiation of the Triple Alliance negotiations
and renegotiations as well as material on the Reinsurance Treaty.
118 Langer, Franco-Russian Alliance,
88.
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conditions not changed, it quite probably would have
resulted in gains in the Balkans.

This goes far in

explaining Giers' repeated attempts at renewal of the
Reinsurance Treaty.

Strengthening this course was the great

deal of tension between France and Russia since 1870.
after Bismarck did a gradual change occur.

Only

The turning

point for this change came in 1887 when various agreements
made Franco-Russian cooperation imperative.

In 1887-88,

Bismarck uloed the German bond market to Russia, a move for
which no adequate explanation was given or has been given
since, but which certainly drove a loan-desperate Russia
closer to France.119

Maneuvering to preserve peace, an

element essential to preserving the Reich, Bismarck then
worked out such agreements as the Mediterranean Agreements.
These assured the status quo in the whole of the
Mediterranean.

The agreement itself, conclued between

Austria, England, and Italy, placed not Germany 1...ut England
in a position of solid opposition to French and Russian
expansion.

The Reinsurance Treaty, in turn, encouraged

Russian policy in the Near East, thus making France the only
enemy of Germany, pitting France and Russia against England,
and making an Anglo-German agreement more appealing to the

119It may be speculated that Bismarck's reasoning was
simply his traditional support of the Junker class, not only
in financial protection but for the tradition of GermanSlavic tension as well.
Fuller goes farther to suggest that
Bismarck felt in control through the Reinsurance Treaty and
could do as he pleased, believing that the Russians could
not afford to question German actions.
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government in London.

Naturally, the two powers most

threatened would seek cooperation against a common enemy,
and so it was that France and Russia turned their combined
suspicion towards England.120
complete.

Bismarck's system was

He had surrounded Germany with states contesting

against each other, leaving Germany free to seek its own
aims.
Germany, as a common enemy, was the requirement for full
Franco-Russian cooperation and possible alliance.
scenario did not exist before 1890.

This

Despite the view of the

French Revanchards that alliance with Russia was the only
hope of slipping cut of isolation, many French statesmen
were either more realistic or were unable to reconcile their
republicanism with Russian autocracy.

Russia would not help

in securing Alsace-Lorraine and any settlement with Russia
would assuredly be to the detriment if not renunciation of
French policy in the Near East.

Most important, such an

alliance would alienate England completely and drive it
towards Germany.

Russia did not wish to see France further

weakened, but that was the extent of concern.

The royal

houses of both Germany and Russia were united by dynastic
considerations, the Polish question, and opposition to
republicanism.

No Franco-Russian alliance was therefore

possible as long as Russia viewed German friendship as its
120Ful ler, Bismarck's Diplomacy at its Zenith, 29 ff.
Fuller claims that Russia signed the Reinsurance Treaty only
with the possibility of an Anglo-Russian war in mind.
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only defense against attack from the West.121
That was the situation in 1890.

On the surface Europe

seemed calm, but below both French and Russian attempts to
destroy the Mediterranean coalition continued.

With

Bismarck on the scene there was little chance of success,
since it was he who manipulated the powers in an attempt to
maintain the status quo.

Bismarck's disappearance was

significant enough, and France and Russia both believed the
collapse of the Triple Alliance was imminent.

The

abandonment of the Reinsurance Treaty was actually perceived
in Berlin as a move to simplify the Bismarckian system and
make it more attractive to members of the Triple Alliance.
Continued French and Russian efforts to undermine this
system, independent of each other until this time, were now
gradually coming into sync.

This cooperation grew as

anxiety developed that Germany now sought to create its own
coalition system instead of using a coalition system to
maintain the status quo, thus becoming the enemy of Russia
as well as France.122

121G.P. III, no. 455.
For comments by Alexander III
and Giers concerning the French Republic, see G.P. III, nos.
617, 621; IV, 760, 761; V, 978, 1118, 1112; VI 1205, 1210, 1218.
122Pribram, Die politische Geheimvertraege OesterreichUnaarns 48 ff; Kurt Koerlin, Zur Vorgeschichte der russichfranzoesisichen Buendnisse
1979-1890 (Stuttgart, 1926),
223. See also Wilhelm Koehlen, ed., Revanche-idee und
Panslavismus, vols of Zur europaeischen Politik (Berlin, 1919).
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The new men in Berlin were more than a little
apprehensive over the complexity of the Bismarckian system.
Whether they sought to change this course or believed their
actions would preserve it is difficult to ascertain.

Only

after the results of their actions did they realize the
consequences, if only to a limited extent.

Evidence cited

in chapter two indicates that the change was not made
consciously, but whether conscious or not the results were
the same.

Bismarck's system was shattered.

Only the

slightest chance for saving relations with Russia existed,
but the government in Berlin let this chance slip away
despite repeated renegotiation attempts by Russians.

From

1890 to 1894 the situation slowly petrified, culminating in
the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894.
Relations between France and Russia steadily grew more
intimate by early 1891.

By March 1891 a rapprochement

between Germany and England was worked out, resulting in the
Heligoland Treaty.

German support of the Polish party in

Posen further annoyed Russia, which at this time felt the
need for French financial support at home and aid in Asia
against Britain.

On July 21, the French Battle Squadron

received an enthusiastic welcome from sailors in the
Kronstadt harbor.

Incredibly, the French people took a

Franco-Russia Alliance as a fact already, not knowing
Russia's real situation but being so overcome with Russian
enthusiasm.

In late August 1891, the principles of a future
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agreement were being laid down.

The German government

showed no signs of alarm and Caprivi, being constantly
assured by Russia, expressed the opinion that these
principles would restore the equilibrium of Europe and would
in no way threaten peace.123

In truth, there was to be an

armed peace with little understanding or equilibrium.
German action drove Russia closer to France.

Every

The evidence

is clear that the renewal of the Triple Alliance and
Germany's flirting with the English led to the conclusion of
the entente.124
In January 1892, the Tsar ratified the Franco-Russian
Military Convention.

In essence the provisions put forth

were the basis of the future Franco-Russian Alliance.
Negotiations in August 1893 led to even closer ties, and on
16 December the Tsar spoke openly to the chief French
negotiator, Comte Montebello, describing his full intentions
of alliance with France.

This conversation meant the

definitive acceptance of the August Convention.

On January

4, 1894, Montebello replied to his government that the

123Georges Michon, The Franco-Russian Alliance, 18911917, trans, by Norman Thomas (New York, 1929), 26-31.
124The evidence that this was the situation is
undeniable. The embittered Bismarck was correct in
attributing the alliance to the mistakes of German policy.
The conclusive evidence that English association with the
Triple Alliance was the convincing element to the Tsar of
the need for closer relations with the French may be found
in G.P. VII, nos. 1502,1507, and 1504 which emphasize Russia
now felt more threatened than isolated; no. 1726; and the
reports of Belgian diplomats in Koehler, 284, 288, 290-91.
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Franco-Russian Alliance, consisting of the agreement of
August 1891 and supplemented by the Military convention of
1894, was a reality.
German policy after 1893 sought to split the alliance in
many ways.

This may have been possible if German policy

toward the end of the century had been conducted with more
continuity of purpose.

However, the belief that the "bear

and the whale," as Holstein termed Russia and England, could
not come to agreement and that Germany was strong enough to
follow a unilateral free-handed policy only applied as long
as it did not simultaneously oppose Russian and British
interest.

After 1898, Germany managed to do just this with

the building of a large navy and support to Turkey.125
Nevertheless, in the Autumn of 1894 a new phase of
limited cooperation developed between Russia and Germany
based on the common interests of the two conservative
powers.

The main reason for this rekindling of conservative

considerations was the new Chancellor in Germany and the new
Tsar in Russia, both very conservative minded men.

This

limited partnership found its field of cooperation in the
Far East.

The victorious Japanese had imposed the Peace

Treaty of Shimonoseki on the Chinese at the conclusion of
the Sino-Japanese War in 1895.

Both Germany and Russia had

protested this vigorously, but to no effect.

The Kaiser saw

125Hajo Holborn, Deutschland und die Tuerkei
(Berlin, 1926), 103ft.

1878-90

105
the Japanese as a threat to Europe, but also wanted to
distract Russian interests from the Balkans, which would
probably put Germany in conflict with England.

Russia's

intervention was more direct and was a cause for the RussiaJapanese War of 1904-1905.

The most serious result of the

cooperative intervention for both nations was the
provocation of friction with Britain, especially now that
Germany was entering its Weltpolitik phase.

Pressure on

Britain to join the Triple Alliance found no echo in London.
Consequently, Russia shied away from further Russo-German
cooperation in the light of Germany's courting of a AngloGerman agreement, realizing the difficulties of policy if
caught between interests and alliances.126

In Germany, the

relevance of the loss of Russian cooperation, if only
limited, was hardly noticed.

Germany fell back on the

policy of a western European coalition and Russia was left
to slip away again.
The crux of the matter is that after 1894, the FrancoRussian Alliance was a matter of fact.

Diplomatically

speaking, Germany had created the situation for the alliance
and had to deal with the consequences of it.

Nonacceptance

of this fact was a very serious diplomatic error.

By its

manipulations and maneuvers to form coalition forces against

126Geiss, German Foreign POlicy, 68-71; Ivo J. Lederer,
Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective
(London, 1962),
204-6, 405-6.
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this alliance, Germany proved its nonacceptance and
consequential error.

The pivot for further German policy

until the outbreak of war in 1914 was to be England.

The

single enemy of Bismarckian policy was becoming two.

German

diplomacy turned its back on Russia.

Instead of seeking to

make gains with the only nation in Europe in formal
alliances with France, thereby endearing itself to Russia
and perhaps even France, Germany sought an aggressive policy
against France through England, a matter which the English
opposed.

Only dynastic conservative ties remained and these

were not enough to ensure steady relations.

The

personalities of Edward VII and William II were too
different to allow harmony, even though Edward was William's
uncle.

This in itself was part of the problem.

William

always felt that his uncle disapproved of his ways, and as a
result William became even more of a sensationalist.

At

times William would so upset Edward that the monarch simply
ignored him altogether.
problem.

But personalities were not the only

Edward and William held differing views of

governing.

Edward lived by the rules of a constitutional

monarch and himself was known for a certain diplomatic
skill.

William showed none of his famous uncle's talent in

foreign relations or tolerance for domestic troubles,
preferring instead the mantle of an autocrat.

Domestic and

family ties, to a great extent, prevented any reconciliation
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between Germany and England.127
Still, the immediate effect of the Franco-Russian
Alliance was relative stability in European diplomacy.

On

the other hand, overseas expansion increased dramatically
after 1894.

Until 1904 European interests did not center on

the Near East, but in Africa, Asia, and the Far East.
Relations between governments became much more greatly
affected by overseas rivalries than by European politics.
The Triple and Dual Alliances did not prevent the formation
of temporary alliances toward international ends.

It was

assumed that as long as the underdeveloped areas under
scrutiny could be divided peacefully, the European situation
would remain stable.

Not until 1905 was the center of

international relations once again formed in Europe.128
Largely due to this new situation in diplomacy,
internatio

politics between 1894 and 1904 developed along

three main axis.

The first of these axis was the Russian

interests in the Far East to such an extent that its
concerns in Europe were largely abandoned.

Russia did not

assist Britain to any great extent in punishing Turkey for
massacres in Armenia, a situation in which she could have
exploited traditional ambitions.

To prevent any redress of

the Eastern question in 1897, Russia went as far as to sign

127Sir Philip Montefiore Magnus, King Edward the
Seventh (New York, 1964), 204-209.
'28 Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Alliance
'
and Triple
Entente (New York, 1971), 45-6.
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a status quo agreement concerning the Balkans with its prime
rival in the region, Austria-Hungary.

With this, Russia

plunged into the Far East, a policy which was welcomed and
encouraged by Germany.
The second axis was the adoption of a unilateral policy
by Germany.

A Franco-Russian Alliance was dangerous for

Germany, but Germany was able to work with the fact that
France and Russia were both on bad terms with Britain.
Particularly after 1897, Germany played one or the other off
against Britain, siding with one then the other and seeking
a way to secure something for itself.

Also during this

time, Germany brought up the idea of a continental coalition
aimed at Britain on several occasions.

This idea was

encouraged but never accepted in Paris or St. Petersburg.
Overall, its anti-British policy yielded little, and in 1890
the German government came to the conclusion that it was
time for a rapprochement with Britain.
The third tendency was a consequence of this decision,
namely the growing isolation of Britain.
been the favored policy of Great Britain.

Isolation had long
Salisbury,

however, had felt it necessary to abandon this policy.

In

1887 Britain entered into the Mediterranean Agreement with
Italy and in 1891 had incorporated with the Triple Alliance
enough to help drive Russia and France together.

Agreement

on the Near East lapsed as Russia turned to the Far East,
and Britain looked to a positioning of the Ottoman Empire,
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more regarded as highly suspicious in Germany, which wholly
rejected the proposal.

Resentful of German interference in

the Transvaal, in controversy with France over Egypt, and
alarmed over Russian moves in China, Britain was isolated in
Europe in 1898.

Given the situation of a German state

dealing freely, Britain perceived an Anglo-German agreement
as the most likely possibility to end this isolation.129
With German expansion abroad, an eventual conflict with
Britain became unavoidable.

The situation between the two

nations was bad enough, and was aggravated more by German
feelings toward Britain.130

Germans admired Britain but

also felt inferior and resenttul in regards to it.

By the

end of the century, Germany was far more anti-British than
Britain was anti-German.

The Kaiser, however, was never

fully anti-British, and tor tactical reasons, the German
government pursued a policy of restraint.

British

resentment over the seizure of Kiaochow was only matched
over concern with the growing German battle fleet.

The more

the fleet grew, the more challenged England felt and the
more opposed it became to German expansion.

From the German

side, it became more important to maintain relations with
England for fear of a continental war.

Only an agreement

1290ron James Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy, with
Special Reference to England and Germany, 1890-1914. (New
York, 1940), 171-75.
130Kehr has an invaluable discussion of this in
Englandhass und Weltpolitik, 149-75.
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towards strengthening both navies would allow any
rapprwheMent.

Any attempts at improvement of relations

following other lines would be futile if this fundamental
element was not overcome.
The British were the first to initiate diplomatic
activity in 1898.

Britain was in a dilemma.

There was risk

of war with France in Africa, the coming of war in South
Africa, Russian power in the Far East was growing, and on
March 28 the German Reichstag passed the First Navy Law to
construct the German battle fleet.

On March 29, Joseph

Chamberlain, British Colonial Secretary, met with German
Ambassador Count Hatzfeldt, and explained that in light of
its difficulties Britain would revise its world policy of
nonalliance.

Also, Britain would prefer a German alliance

because of the small amount of problems between the two
nations.

Such an alliance would be equivalent to Britain

joining the Triple Alliance, but Hatzfeldt took it to mean
that Britain was ready to join the coalition, an error in
understanding that helped considerably in bringing the
negotiations to an end.131
The chance of an Anglo-German agreement was seriously
hampered from both sides.
narrow political basis.

From the start, the talks had a

Chamberlain and the Chancellor of

the Exchequer, Arthur Balfour, were the only cabinet members

131Rich, Holstein, II, 567-82.
G.P. 3779-3805.

For the German side see
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to see an Anglo-German agreement as desirable.
reaction to the initiative was cautious.
for continuance

Berlin's

No instructions

c negotiations were given to Hatzfeldt.

Bernhard von Buelow, Chancellor since 1897, saw the
initiative as due to impending war with the French in Sudan.
Britain met this suspicion with its own, seeing German
requests for a clarification of its position with France as
trying to force a rupture in Anglo-French relations for its
own political ends.132

German restraint is explainable.

Berlin feared Britain was using them to block Russian
ambitions, but hoped that a worsening foreign position and
the presence of a powerful German navy would force the
British to offer better conditions.
By now it was clear that neither nation was committed to
a full-fledged alliance.

Only the intervention of Hermann

von Eckardstein, London German Embassy Councillor, kept
negotiations from ending at this point.

But this

intervention was without authorization and only meant to
further Eckandstein's political ambitions.
information aborted a new round of talks.

The false
Though talks

continued into early May, the idea of a general alliance was
replaced by bilateral agreements on special problems such as
the Baghdad Railway, Samoa, and the Portuguese colonies.
Britain took these agreements as purely speculative.
Germany seemed to be threatening Britain to force them to

132ibid., 574f.
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make an Anglo-German treaty.

In negotiations with Portugal,

over colonial possessions and loans, Britain alienated
Germany once more, while Germany persisted in its aim of
possessing a colonial block in Africa.133

For all its

promise, the possibility of an Anglo-German agreement had
come to nothing.
After being isolated at the Hague Peace Conference of
1899 and attempts at exploiting British embarrassment in
South Africa, Germany still remained neutral in the Boer War
and even warded off French and Russian protests, receiving
overtures of gratitude from England and violent reaction
from the German public.

German actions had amounted to

support for the British and relations remained ambivalent.
Buelow and Chamerberlain agreed to use this improvement of
relations for a more serious rapprochement during the
Kaiser's visit to Britain.

But German public opinion,

excited to the point of hysteria by the English seizure of
German mail boats in December 1899 and the passage of the
Second Navy Law bringing the projected fleet to 36 capital
ships negated attempts at rapprochement.

The Boxer

Rebellion in the summer of 1900 once again brought about
hopes for some accommodation, since neither Germany nor
Britain wished to see other nations make territorial gains
133G.P., 3806-3883; see also C.J. Lowe,
"The Reluctant
Imperialists," British Foreign Policy, 1879-1902, I (London,
1967), 218-22, and Paul M. Kennedy, "German World Policy and
the Alliance Negotiations with England, 1897-1900," Journal
of Modern History, 45 (Dec. 1973), 605-25.
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in China.

Germany now hoped to bind Britain to the Triple

Alliance.

Germany realized that if it and Britain did not

ally, France and Russia might well do so.

Holstein wished

to continue good relations with Britain, knowing that German
naval ambitions were incompatible with this and consequently
skeptical of them.

In his view, closer ties should be

sought without letting it appear that the initiative came
from Germany.

But again, Eckardstein's interference caused

each side to believe too much in the other's eagerness for
alliance.

As a result, both sides waited for an overture

from the other, an overture which was never to come.134
Nothing came out of Anglo-German diplomacy because
Germany sought closer ties while Britain wanted only an
understanding over such things as the Boer War and Samoa.
Germany wished to bind Britain in a regular treaty to the
Triple Alliance, a move which would have greatly increased
the territorial security of Austria-Hungary and the strength
of German dealings in the Balkans.

However, concessions

concerning the battle fleet, the area Britain considered
critical, were out of the question.

Britain would only

agree to a loose arrangement on such terms.

Negotiations,

therefore, from 1898 to 1901, yielded nothing due to cross
purposes.

By December 1901, Britain no longer needed German

support in South Africa and Germany was again convinced of

134Rich, Holstein, II, 614-16;
4979-5035, 5005.

GP, 4511-698, 4980,
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the impossibility of an Anglo-Franco-Russian Entente.

On

January 30, 1902, Britain entered an alliance with Japan.
The British abandonment of its isolation policy with Germany
as a partner was to be of serious detriment to German policy
in the future.135

The Anglo-3apanese Alliance began what Immanuel Geiss has
called the 'containment' of German Weltpolitik.

While this

may not have been the original purpose behind the treaty,
the realignments it set in motion, ending with the Triple
Entente in 1907, certainly had that effect.

A common

interest of the treaty was halting Russian pressure in
Korea.

As in the Shimonoseki incident in 1895, Britain and

Japan as naval powers faced the continental powers of Russia
and Germany.

Russian overtures to Germany, however, for a

united Franco-German-Russian front demanding the status quo
in China be maintained was rejected.

Buelow put up the

pretended fear that any alliance along these lines was
encouragement to a Russian policy in Manchuria which could
be embarrassing to Germany.

Germany's actual policy in the

Far East as early as 1901 was to incite a war between Russia
and Japan over Manchuria and Korea, though Russia and Japan
needed little help from Germany in going to war.136

The aim

was to prevent cooperation between the two and bring Russia

135G.P., ibid.
136ibid., 5725, 5726.
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closer to Germany in a fight against revolutionary forces in
Europe.

Buelow warned against pushing too quickly for fear

of alarming the Russians into making an agreement with Japan
and subsequently driving them closer to Britain.

To his and

the Kaiser's disgust, these machinations to produce war
seemed to have little effect, certainly not to the extent of
rushing the Russians.

By the autumn of 1903, tension was

high but there was still no war.

As the confrontation

mounted in 1904, Germany remained neutral in hopes that a
Russo-Japanese war would delay any rapprochement between
Russia and Britain, and when the war broke out in February
1904, tried to turn Russian difficulties in the Far East
against the Franco-Russian Alliance.

This alliance was

meant to counter threats from the Triple Alliance; France
was not obliged to assist Russia against Japan, and its
neutrality during the war was a strain to the alliance.
For Germany, the situation had become complicated.
Renewal of the Triple Alliance was difficult due to the
divergent aims of Austria-Hungary and Italy.

Differences

had not mattered so much when France was isolated and
Italy's imperialistic aims were not in conflict with
Germany.

After signing the Franco-Russian Alliance, France

became more interested in a rapprochement with Italy. -37
The secret agreements between France and Italy of November
1902 calling for neutrality in case of a war against any two
137Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 10.
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other powers threatened the Triple Alliance.

The question

was asked whether the Triple Alliance was a defensive or
offensive pact.

The answer is that it was both.

Behind the

facade of defense, Austria-Hungary used the pact for gains
in the Balkans and Germany in expansion of Weltpolitik.

The

Triple Alliance was renewed on June 28, 1902, but Italy's
liberalness and sympathy for the national movements in the
Balkans threatened to widen the gulf between it and the more
conservative members.

In addition, Italy wanted territory

in Austria and therefore saw no reason in being allied to
her.

From 1902 onwards, Italy drifted away from the Triple

Alliance and in May 1915 opted to side with the Allies
against Germany.138
Even as the Triple alliance began to crumble, Britain and
France entered into negotiations.

Because of tension

between Britain and Russia, the German Foreign Office
thought any agreement impossible, but even the Tsar was
urging France in that direction.

The Entente itself,

recognized on April 8, 1904, was not a formal alliance but
pledged mutual diplomatic support over Egypt and Morocco.
Still, the Entente began a phase of cooperation which soon
evidenced itself in military and naval spheres.

This

Entente was the first real international move against

138F. Fellner, Der Dreibund (Vienna, 1906), 36-49.
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Weltpolitik.139

Germany now sought a diplomatic triumph.

It became

necessary to divert attention away from the long-term
failure of Weltoolitik behind the new Entente.

The weakness

of Russia after its loss in the Russo-Japanese War and the
weakness of the Franco-Russian Alliance due to French
neutrality during the war offered Germany a chance to recoup
its losses.

Germany initiated a policy of isolating France

by destroying the alliance with Russia and thus neutralizing
the Anglo-French Entente.

The first step was in concluding

a commercial treaty with Russia in July 1904.
made Russia dependent on exports from Germany.

This treaty
Russian

resistance to this was weak due to its bleak situation.
Exploitation of Russia in this ruthless fashion only
increased resentment against Germany.

Revolutionary unrest

in 1905 found Germany resorting to the former idea of a
Russo-German agreement.

Had the policy been successful, the

gains made by Germany would have been spectacular.

Not only

would France be isolated, but won over, following suit with
a Russia entering bilateral agreements with Germany.
Furthermore, such agreements would quiet fear of an emerging
Triple Entente.

Negotiations in November 1904 led to the

first drafts of a Russo-German treaty, but Frnch agreement
139P.J.V. Rolo, Entente Cordiale: The Origins and
Negotiations of the Anglo-French Agreements of 8 April 1904
(London, 1969), 51-63.
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was crucial.

Russia would only agree to a treaty if France

were asked to join.

Germany, seeking only agreements with

Russia which would draw France into an alliance where the
German position would not be weakened, quickly lost interest
and dropped negotiations.

After the July 1905 failed

meeting between the Tsar and Kaiser at Bjoerkoe, German
leaders began to see the possibility of an encirclement of
Germany by the other powers.'"
Diplomatically, the failed attempts of the alliance at
Bjoerkoe in the summer of 1905 had been doomed with the
First Moroccan Crisis earlier in the year.

Preceded by a

political offensive against France, which brought about the
downfall of the French Foreign Minister Declasse, Germany
suggested an international conference in Morocco.

Germany

hoped to put conditions on French expansion in Morocco with
the help of the international community.

A diplomatic

defeat in Morocco, Germany speculated, would force France to
join a German-led coalition.

But German speculation became

diplomatic force.

German pressure for the conference was

handled clumsily.

The Kaiser's landing at Tangiers on March

31 in support of the Sultan only led to suspicion over
Germany's true motives, especially with the landing coming
in the heels of the German rejection of a French initiative
for bilateral agreements.

It was clear to the world that

Germany sought to humiliate France.
140G.P., 6118, 6127, 7349.

This was also the first
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real test of the Entente.
The result of this diplomatic tangle was suspicion on the
part of the rest of the world and a feeling of diplomatic
victory in Germany due to Declasse's downfall.

Germany now

turned back to the East with the meeting at Bjoerkoe.

But

Russian reliance on German capital, which Germany used as a
diplomatic weapon, was being supplemented through French
loans once more.

Also, the internal struggle among the

Kaiser and his advisors over the provisions of the treaty
dampened German enthusiasm.

Add to this the fact that the

Russian government would not endorse the signature of the
Tsar over to a draft of the treaty (which Germany saw as
binding) because it did not want to turn its back on France
and give itself over to Germany, and it is easy to
understand the failure to reach an agreement.141

The

Franco-Russian Alliance, badly shaken for even a year, was
solid once again.
The final development of the Moroccan Crisis was the
Algeciras Conference of January-June 1906.

By November

1905, it was clear that the separation of Russia from France
would be difficult.

Soon after entering the conference,

Germany realized it had miscalculated.

Only Austria

supported the German position on Morocco.

The other powers

suspected Germany sought provocation for war with France.

141ibid., 6202-58; and M.S. Anderson, The Eastern
Question (London, 1966), 58-89.
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Faced with isolation, Holstein wished to abandon the
conference, but Buelow and the Kaiser gave in to the
principle of French control of Morocco in return for French
concession to save German face.
signed on June 7, 1906.

The Algeciras Act was

This diplomatic defeat highlighted

what had too long been overlooked by Germany statesmen.
Germany had overreached itself.

The Entente was now firmly

established and led directly to the Anglo-Russian Agreement
of 1907 and the isolation of Germany.

Furthermore, Holstein

fell from power, leaving Germany without any competent
foreign policy direction.142

Because of its humiliation,

Germany developed its fear of encirclement, resulting in the
creation of the Schlieffen Plan, and a dislike of
international conferences which could decide on German
ambitions.

International isolation had been painful and

would decide the German course of action up to 1914.

142ibid., 7237-75.

Chapter V
Conclusions

The conflicting motives behind German foreign policy
and diplomacy from 1890 to 1906 make it difficult to
ascertain any one factor which affected the course of
policy.

Certainly before 1890 policy

as more consistent,

but that consistency had been deteriorating for several
years.

It is highly evident that one of Germany's main

problems was the lack of competent men willing to serve in
the higher echelons of government.
for this.

Several reasons exist

First of all, Bismarck had neglected to train

others to take his place.

Bismarck had wrapped the control

of domestic and foreign policy around his own person.
Whether this was for jealous motives or, in Bismarck's view,
there was simply no one able to perform the various duties
involved as well as himself is unclear.

But no matter the

reasoning for it, Bismarck's concentration of power was a
detriment as his own control faltered and other forces began
seeking political power.
Secondly, once Bismarck had gone, William began his own
personal regime, attempting to take the place of Bismarck in
governmental control.

Had William possessed at least some

of Bismarck's ability, the course of German policy might
have been more consistent.

Also, the men he chose as his

first two Chancellors, Leo von Caprivi and
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Chlodwig zu
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Hohenlohe, were not chosen for shining political or
diplomatic credentials (though Hohenlohe was a respected
statesman on the local level and somewhat of a diplomat) but
instead for ability to aid the Kaiser in his schemes by
supporting him.
and Hohenlohe.

He found this difficult with both Caprivi
In turn, these two men relied almost

entirely in the end on subordinates in the Foreign Office
for the making of foreign policy.

Friedrich von Holstein is

the most obvious example of this.

It was he who formulated

overall policy for the most part until 1897, and his
manipulation of the field posts of the Foreign Office show
that, like his Kaiser, he sought only those who would follow
a line of policy dictated by him.
The men chosen for foreign diplomatic assignments leads
to the third point.

Those who assumed important posts

abroad and in the Foreign Office after Bismarck were not of
Bismarck's generation.

They were of a generation born after

1861 or were too young to remember the events surrounding
unification, and they saw power in a wholly different light
from their predecessors.

This in itself was not a serious

detriment to the German position.

But two influencing

factors changed this generation gap into a fundamental
defect of German policy making.

First, there existed very

few cautious men to guide the new policy of German world
power as opposed to continental power.

Theobald von

Bethmann Hollweq and Georg Michaelis were cautious men, but
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Bethmann Hollweg did not become Chancellor until 19C9
(Michaelis not until 1917), and it might be speculated that
the situation was already too difficult for even a cautious
man to control.

This is especially true with weak

personalities such as those of Bethmann Hollweg and
Michaelis.

Secondly, the world situation in the 1890s

changed too rapidly for German policy and policymakers to
adapt.
As demonstrated in this study,

internal situation in

Germany influencing policy up to 1890 had been one of
preserving a status quo in and outside Germany to maintain
German power.

After 1890, those groups inside Germany who

had led nationalistic tendencies found a new following.

In

retrospect, it is as if the passing on of Bismarck was a
relief of some oppressive pressure on German dreams of world
recognition.

The Junkers envisioned controlling an

expanding German base of power, the industrialists sought
monetary gain through naval expansion, and the average
German dreamed of a greater, more glorious Germany.

The

leaders of the German government, from the Kaiser downward,
adopted and recklessly sought to achieve this popular
sentiment.

The shift in politics was sudden, from

aristocratic, Honoratorieren- politik, to popular politics.
Considering the outdated form of German government, this
switch was all too sudden.

The autocratic system did not

have any efficient way of dealing with popular demands and
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pressures of society.

As a result, the popular sentiments

adopted found immediate, autocratic expression instead of
deliberated, rational application.

Extended to policy, it

produced a policy of risk, or crisis diplomacy, where the
effects of any given crisis were observed and trying to take
advantage once the effects were known.
While the flaws of government and William II's
amenableness to social tendencies are much to blame for the
recklessness of policy,

William's close associates

influenced him to such a degree that many times William's
ideas were those planted by others.

Philipp von Eulenberq,

Albert Bailin, and Fritz Krupp were not only his friends,
but in ways mirror images of a multi-faceted personality.
Eulenberg mirrored the Kaiser to a degree, but was conscious
enough of his influence to use it.
William's schemes.

He tempered and polished

Ballin, the strong businessman, appealed

to William's aggressive, adventurous side.

Krupp was weak,

nervous, and found an empathetic relationship with William's
more timid side.

These associations, though perhaps

advantageous to William's emotional states at times,
certainly were detrimental to policy making.
Overall, the German government was an irrational
institution.

It combined old policies with new.

wonder that German policy making was chaotic.
simply too many variables.

It is no

There were

It is even more obvious, as it

should have been to the new men in Berlin in the 1890s, that
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their erratic course in foreign policy would cause suspicion
and distrust on the part of the other powers.

Failing to

notice this, despite warnings from more seasoned men, German
foreign policy more or less bounced from situation to
situation, crisis to crisis, each of ever-growing intensity,
like a pinball going for tilt or oblivion.

The failure to

renew the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia marked the
inauguration of this course.

Chapter four of this study

demonstrates that German policy had abandoned attempts at
status quo agreements, and to a great degree long-term
agreements, opting instead for crisis diplomacy.
German goals were short-term.

In short,

No long range policy existed

for the establishment of German world power.

The desire for

domination, the appetite for power, was so great that only
policies which offered immediate satisfaction were sought.
In the sense of a modern state, Germany was still far too
backward to play the game of international politics
responsibly.

S
•
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